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100 N.C. L. REV. 557 (2022)

NATURAL PUNISHMENT*
RAFF DONELSON**
A man, carrying a gun in his waistband, robs a food vendor. In making his
escape, the gun discharges, critically injuring the robber. About such instances,
it is common to think, “he got what he deserved.” This Article seeks to explore
cases like that—cases of “natural punishment.” Natural punishment occurs
when a wrongdoer faces serious harm that results from her wrongdoing and not
from anyone seeking retribution against her. The Article proposes that U.S.
courts follow their peers and recognize natural punishment as genuine
punishment for legal, specifically constitutional, purposes. Were U.S. courts to
do so, they would need to reduce the amount of punishment they would otherwise
bestow on wrongdoers upon conviction if a natural punishment has occurred or
foreseeably will occur. A handful of foreign jurisdictions already accept
something like this Article’s proposal, but natural punishment has no formal legal
recognition in the United States. The goal of this Article is twofold: first, it offers
a rigorous and defensible definition of natural punishment by distinguishing it
from nearby notions and dispelling any association with supernatural ideas;
second, it demonstrates that recognizing natural punishment as genuine
punishment will not much disturb existing American legal institutions and
understandings.
As an added bonus, the concept of natural punishment can be employed to solve
a longstanding problem in criminal law theory, the Mystery of Credit for Time
Served. The Mystery surrounds the common practice of giving prisoners credit
toward their prison sentences for their time served in jail awaiting trial. The
Mystery poses a dilemma about whether the detention time was punishment: If
it was punishment, then the detainee was punished before trial in violation of
Due Process; however, if the time was not punishment, there is no reason to
discount the prison sentence. Seeing the time in detention as an instance of
natural punishment resolves the Mystery.

* © 2022 Raff Donelson.
** Associate Professor of Law, Penn State Dickinson Law. Thanks are owed to Nick Gonano,
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Scholars Forum, and a 2021 session of the Illinois Fall Workshop. Finally, for specific feedback, I thank
Paul Butler, Sarah Davila-Ruhaak, Brian Frye, Ken Levy, Dan McConkie, Eric Miller, Colleen
Murphy, and India Thusi. This project was supported in part by the LSU ASPIRE Grant.

100 N.C. L. REV. 557 (2022)

558

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 558
I.
DEFINING NATURAL PUNISHMENT ...................................... 563
A. Other Thinkers on Natural Punishment ............................... 564
B. Natural Punishment Does Not Require Magic ...................... 567
C. Natural Punishment Does Not Presuppose a Particular
Justification of Punishment ................................................. 568
D. Natural Punishment as Real Punishment .............................. 571
E. Summary ........................................................................ 573
II.
NATURAL PUNISHMENT AS CONSTITUTIONAL
PUNISHMENT ....................................................................... 573
A. The Proposal .................................................................... 573
B. Qualifying the Proposal ....................................................... 575
C. How It Works .................................................................. 576
III. THREE PUZZLES................................................................... 578
A. Excessive Punishment ........................................................ 578
B. Pretrial Punishment .......................................................... 582
C. Successive Punishment ....................................................... 583
IV. LOOSE ENDS & FUTURE PROJECTS ...................................... 586
A. Vigilantism and Other Events Verging on Natural Punishment 586
B. The Flipside: Undoing Extra Benefits of Wrongdoing ............. 588
C. Thorny Quotidian Questions: Proof, Costs, and Declinations ... 589
1. Proving Natural Punishment ..................................... 589
2. Fashioning the Discounts ...........................................591
3. The Cost of Natural Punishment Determinations .......591
D. Justifying the Natural Punishment Intuition .......................... 592
V.
A FORAY INTO COMPARATIVE LAW ..................................... 594
A. Germany ......................................................................... 594
B. Sweden ........................................................................... 595
C. Australia ......................................................................... 596
CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 598
INTRODUCTION
Terrion Pouncy was an unlucky criminal. Armed with a .38 caliber pistol,
Pouncy robbed Maxwell Street Express, a hot dog stand on Chicago’s
Southside.1 After lifting cash and two employees’ phones and wallets, he took

1. David Moye, Man Shot Himself in Penis While Robbing Hot Dog Stand, Police Say, HUFFPOST
(Nov. 3, 2017, 1:04 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/shoot-penis-hot-dog-stand_n_59fc8f64e4b0
b0c7fa39d30f [https://perma.cc/52PP-P6GQ].
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off running.2 While in flight, he accidentally triggered the pistol in his
waistband, shooting himself in the penis.3
Brittany Stephens was even more unlucky. Stephens was a passenger in a
small SUV, an overcrowded small SUV at that.4 The vehicle had seats for five,
but on a fateful October day in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, it held eight people:
four adults and four children, including Stephens’s infant daughter.5
Irresponsibly and illegally, Stephens placed her baby in a car seat and wedged
the car seat between the front two seats on the center console.6 Christopher
Manuel, an off-duty police officer, was driving recklessly at ninety-four miles
per hour when the speed limit was fifty.7 He struck the SUV, killing the infant.8
Stephens was charged with negligent homicide for failing to properly secure the
car seat, which contributed to her baby’s death.9
Cases like the preceding are paradigmatic instances of what I call natural
punishment. Roughly, the idea is that, in such cases, the world punishes the
wrongdoer.10 Natural punishment may seem mysterious, but it is not unfamiliar.
For one thing, in English, we have a similar term, poetic justice, which is in
common use.11 A central assumption of this Article is that natural punishment
is one of our ideas, but one we fear to be both unsound and unserviceable.
For present purposes, an idea is unsound if it is the kind of idea that turns
out to be nonsense on reflection. The idea of a smallest real number or of a
perpetual motion machine—these are paradigmatic cases of unsound ideas.
Once one has a mature understanding of real numbers or machines, one sees
that those ideas could never be. Is natural punishment like that? An idea is
unserviceable if, whether sound or not, it simply cannot be realized or

2. Id.
3. Id. Cue the wiener puns.
4. Julia Jacobo & Barbara Schmitt, Louisiana Mother Charged with Killing 1-Year-Old Daughter in
Car Crash She Didn’t Cause, ABC NEWS (Mar. 1, 2018, 4:47 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/
louisiana-mother-charged-homicide-crash-killed-year-daughter/story?id=53437927 [https://perma.cc/
RB7W-XA4L].
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Ellyn Couvillion, Off-Duty Baton Rouge Police Officer Going 94 mph in Crash that Killed 1-YearOld Baby, Police Say, ADVOCATE (Feb. 16, 2018, 3:21 PM), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge
/news/crime_police/article_68f0a8ba-135f-11e8-a469-1f2229e20faf.html [https://perma.cc/EE83-B3E
2 (staff-uploaded archive)].
8. Id.
9. Lea Skene & Grace Toohey, Experts Question Mother’s Arrest in Crash that Killed Baby; Off-Duty
Cop Going 94 mph Remains on Paid Leave, ADVOCATE (Feb. 28, 2018, 11:54 AM), https://www.
theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/article_7c7f4602-1cb0-11e8-a723-0bc2db424e30.
html [https://perma.cc/A67Z-VLX2 (staff-uploaded archive)].
10. A formal definition of the phenomenon comes later. See infra Part I.
11. These are similar but not synonymous because natural punishment can be unduly harsh. See
infra Section III.A. Poetic justice, on the other hand, is, well, just. I thank Eric Miller for pressing me
on this.
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implemented in our world as we know it. Perpetual motion machines and cold
fusion are paradigmatic cases of unserviceable ideas. Wonderful as they might
be in theory, these ideas simply cannot take shape in our world. Is natural
punishment like that? In clarifying the idea of natural punishment below, I show
it to be sound, and by explaining how the notion can be incorporated into
American law, I demonstrate its serviceability.
To understand how one can incorporate natural punishment into
American law, consider the following. We not only recognize instances of
natural punishment; we also have various practical intuitions about natural
punishment, that is, “gut feelings” about its goodness or badness and about how
people should respond to instances of it.12 I mention just two of those intuitions
here.
First is the intuition that an instance of natural punishment can be a good
thing. More precisely, we sometimes think that the natural punishment is just
what a wrongdoer deserves.13 The wiener case perhaps activates this intuition.
Second is the intuition that, where natural punishment has befallen a
wrongdoer, would-be punishers should reduce the amount of intentionally
produced punishment that they would otherwise bestow upon the wrongdoer.14
At the limit, we sometimes think that bestowing any intentionally produced
punishment would be excessive because the wrongdoer has already been
punished enough.15 The grief-stricken mother probably draws upon this
intuition. We might find other cases that tug at our heart strings.16 With this
12. Some lawyers will raise an eyebrow at talk of intuitions, fearing that unchecked prejudice or
something worse can be “smuggled” into our thought if we rely on intuitions. I understand this worry,
but I also tend to think intuitions are indispensable for doing normative work. We have to take those
intuitions about specific cases and compare them with more general normative principles that we
endorse, maybe modifying the former, maybe modifying the latter until we reach a coherent outlook.
This process, which Rawls calls “reflective equilibrium,” is really the only game in town. JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 18 (rev. ed. 1999).
13. Thaddeus Metz, Why We Welcome Poetic Justice and Despair at Poetic Injustice, CONVERSATION
(June 21, 2017, 11:18 AM), https://theconversation.com/why-we-welcome-poetic-justice-and-despairat-poetic-injustice-79771 [https://perma.cc/YF8M-QY3P] [hereinafter Metz, Why We Welcome Poetic
Justice and Despair at Poetic Injustice].
14. For empirical evidence that Americans hold this practical intuition, see Paul H. Robinson,
Sean E. Jackowitz & Daniel M. Bartels, Extralegal Punishment Factors: A Study of Forgiveness, Hardship,
Good Deeds, Apology, Remorse, and Other Such Discretionary Factors in Assessing Criminal Punishment, 65
VAND. L. REV. 737, 774–85 (2012).
15. Already punished enough language appears in many places. See, e.g., Hannah Knowles, A Baby
Died After an Officer Crashed His Corvette at 94 mph, Investigators Say. He Won’t Face Charges., WASH.
POST (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/11/15/baby-died-after-cop-drove
-mph-crashed-his-corvette-officer-wont-face-charges/ [https://perma.cc/UJ7T-R7A7 (dark archive)].
16. An interesting case out of Washington State demonstrates how courts might use clever
statutory construction to reach a result that is motivated by the thought that a wrongdoer was already
punished enough. In the case, Teresa Hedlund drank excessive amounts of alcohol with her fiancé and
encouraged him to drive her and five others somewhere. City of Auburn v. Hedlund, 201 P.3d 315,
316–17 (Wash. 2009). The drive resulted in death for six people—everyone but Hedlund. Id. at 317.
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all in mind, to incorporate natural punishment into American law means letting
these practical intuitions influence legal outcomes.
This Article has two main goals: (1) to clarify the notion of natural
punishment, and (2) to propose one way this idea can be incorporated into
American law. To fully vindicate natural punishment would require more moral
and political theorizing to demonstrate that these intuitions about natural
punishment are not mere gut feelings but that they are warranted conclusions
that deserve a formal presence in American law. This Article begins that work
by showing that these intuitions can influence American law without doing too
much damage to the existing architecture. The more philosophical project is
something I now defer; however, if the present effort is successful, it thereby
demonstrates that this more ambitious undertaking is worth pursuing.
While this Article aims to clarify and explain, rather than to justify, my
proposal, the reader should not be wholly left in the dark about those
justifications. First, the idea of letting natural punishment serve as a genuine
legal punishment is already embodied in other developed nations’ legal
systems.17 Thus, in not acknowledging natural punishment, the American
criminal justice system has a blind spot. Second, some American jurists might
already be recognizing natural punishment sotto voce.18 By giving the doctrine a
name, clarifying its contours, and demonstrating that it can comfortably fit
within the American legal system, my proposal promises to bring certain
decisions into the daylight, as it were. Third, natural punishment can serve all
of the classic purposes of intentional punishment;19 refusing to treat it as such
looks hypocritical or implausibly formalistic. Fourth, and finally, my proposal,
if adopted, could provide advocates with a tool in the struggle against
overcriminalization and excessive punishment. Many voices from the

She was, however, severely injured and suffered great emotional pain, due to the death of her fiancé
and friends. Id. at 319. She was charged with, and convicted of, being an accomplice to an instance of
driving under the influence (“DUI”). Id. at 317. Eventually, the Washington Supreme Court would
overturn the conviction because, under Washington law, victims of crimes cannot be accomplices, and
the Washington court found that Hedlund was a victim of the DUI. Id. at 320–21. I called this clever
statutory construction because this seems mistaken as a matter of existing law but good for reaching a
favorable result. The Hedlund court seems mistaken on the law because DUI offenses are,
commonsensically, victimless crimes. If one brings injury to someone or someone’s property during
one’s drunken driving—that is, if there is an actual victim—that is a different crime. Still, Hedlund
had already suffered enough, and the court found a way to reach that result.
17. See infra Part V.
18. See supra note 16.
19. See infra Section I.C.
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academe,20 the bar,21 the bench,22 the press,23 and politicians on the left,24 right,25
and center26 have all expressed concern that America criminalizes too many
things and punishes too harshly. A central part of my proposal is that those who
suffer natural punishment should receive punishment discounts; in other words,
a natural punishment should count against one’s ordinary sentence.27 Were this
to happen, it would mean shorter prison sentences on average. To be sure, my
proposal will not roll back mass incarceration or change the overbroad criminal
20. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 507 (2001)
(“American criminal law, federal and state, is very broad; it covers far more conduct than any
jurisdiction could possibly punish. The federal code alone has thousands of criminal prohibitions
covering an enormous range of behavior, from the heinous to the trivial. State codes are a little
narrower, but not much. . . . Of course, criminal law’s breadth is old news. It has long been a source of
academic complaint.”).
21. Progressive attorney groups such as the National Lawyers Guild and the National Association
of Criminal Defense Lawyers predictably critique mass incarceration and overcriminalization. Our
Work, NAT’L LAWS. GUILD, https://www.nlg.org/our-work [https://perma.cc/7CMW-C82L] (“The
Guild has engaged in numerous initiatives to promote an end to mass incarceration nationally and
locally.”); The Face of Overcriminalization, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAWS. (Aug. 19, 2020), https://
www.nacdl.org/Content/TheFaceofOvercriminalization [https://perma.cc/D8XH-ZAV5]. There has
also been a wave of so-called progressive prosecutors who have joined this chorus of voices. See Heather
L. Pickerell, Critical Race Theory & Power: The Case for Progressive Prosecution, 36 HARV. BLACKLETTER
L.J. 73, 73 (2020) (remarking on “the growing wave of ‘progressive’ prosecutors who have crept into
the national conscience since Larry Krasner’s shock victory in the Philadelphia District Attorney
Democratic primary grabbed headlines in 2017”).
22. Alan Feuer, Federal Judge Urges U.S. To ‘Jettison the Madness of Mass Incarceration,’ N.Y. TIMES
(June 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/24/nyregion/federal-judge-urges-us-to-jettisonthe-madness-of-mass-incarceration.html [https://perma.cc/27SN-3MUX (dark archive)] (chronicling
several federal judges who have criticized mass incarceration).
23. Even the right-wing Christian Broadcasting Network decided to launch “a series of
investigations into a growing phenomenon called ‘overcriminalization’ and how it’s making America a
nation of criminals.” ‘Overcriminalization’ Making Us a Nation of Felons?, CHRISTIAN BROAD.
NETWORK, https://www1.cbn.com/content/overcriminalization-making-us-nation-felons#Transcript
[https://perma.cc/3NJK-DJR2].
24. German Lopez, Bernie Sanders Was Arguing Against Mass Incarceration as Early as
1991, VOX (Feb. 27, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/2/27/182
40474/bernie-sanders-mass-incarceration-president-campaign [https://perma.cc/S7VB-YWKA (staffuploaded archive)] (reporting on left-wing Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders’s crusade against mass
incarceration, long before it was in vogue).
25. Daniel Dew, Senator Rand Paul: Overcriminalization Champion, HERITAGE FOUND. (Dec.
27, 2012), https://www.heritage.org/report/senator-rand-paul-overcriminalization-champion [https://
perma.cc/68NE-MNX4] (reporting on conservative Kentucky Senator Rand Paul’s crusade against
overcriminalization).
26. In 2015, former President Bill Clinton made remarks admitting fault for mass
incarceration and calling for its remediation. Peter Baker, Bill Clinton Concedes His Crime Law Jailed
Too Many for Too Long, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/16/us/
politics/bill-clinton-concedes-his-crime-law-jailed-too-many-for-too-long.html [https://perma.cc/VK6
G-SV3P (dark archive)]. In 2018, centrist Democrat Bob Casey wrote on his social media about
“work[ing] to address our Nation’s mass incarceration problem.” Senator Bob Casey (@SenBobCasey),
TWITTER (Dec. 19, 2018, 12:21 PM), https://twitter.com/SenBobCasey/status/1075440908848508928
[https://perma.cc/3DVC-3VX6].
27. See infra Section II.C.
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codes, but it will place one more tool in the arsenal of those who combat these
problems.
The layout of the Article is as follows. Part I defines natural punishment.
In the course of defining the concept, I show that, unlike karma or divine
punishment, it requires nothing supernatural. Also in Part I, I explain how the
definitional task here is practical as opposed to metaphysical. Parts II and III
concern the incorporation of natural punishment into American law. Part II
explains and illustrates my proposal to treat natural punishment as punishment
for constitutional purposes. Part III raises and resolves three constitutional
puzzles that arise from my proposal. Part IV highlights some important
questions for further research. Part V considers jurisdictions outside of the
United States that already adopt something close to my proposal. Finally, I
conclude by taking a wider view of why one might care about natural
punishment.
I. DEFINING NATURAL PUNISHMENT
Natural punishment, as defined here, refers to any sufficiently serious
adversity resulting from a wrongdoer’s misconduct without the intervention of
anyone intending to cause retributive harm to the wrongdoer. Thus, three
elements define the phenomenon: (1) adversity, (2) caused by wrongdoing, and
(3) not caused by anyone’s intention to exact retribution on the wrongdoer.
A note of clarification about retributive harm is in order. Retribution has at
least two senses, a weak sense and a strong sense.28 In the weak sense, retribution
only requires the aim of getting back at someone for a wrong. In the strong
sense, retribution names some theory that attempts to justify imposing
punishment. When we discuss retribution in the strong sense, notions about
proportionality and the requirement to limit punishment to the perpetrator and
not, say, her kith and kin, emerge.29 Retribution in the strong sense attempts to
explain how and when it is permissible (and perhaps required) to exact
retribution in the weak sense. With that in mind, I can raise and quickly
dispatch a worry about the third element of natural punishment. One might
worry that, on my version of natural punishment, a utilitarian vigilante mob
who beats up a wrongdoer might count as exacting natural punishment because
(1) the roughing-up counts as adversity, (2) the wrongdoing obviously plays
some causal role in the roughing-up, and (3) the mob does not intend to exact
retribution because they are utilitarians, not retributivists. I do not count the
28. For more detailed discussion, see Raff Donelson, Cruel and Unusual What? Toward a Unified
Definition of Punishment, 9 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 1, 37–38 (2016) [hereinafter Donelson, Cruel and
Unusual What?].
29. Retributive thinking did not always have these sorts of limits. As philosopher Philip Kitcher
notes, developing these limits was ethical progress. PHILIP KITCHER, THE ETHICAL PROJECT 140–
41 (2011).
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mob’s actions as natural punishment because they are exacting retribution, just
retribution in the weak sense.30
The two examples from above31 clearly conform to this definition. Pouncy
obviously suffered a traumatic injury, so we have the adversity. This adversity
did result from the wrongdoing, for it seems that his haste in fleeing the scene
of the crime caused him to accidentally shoot himself. If he had not held up the
wiener stand, he would not have had to hurry away from the scene. In fact, he
would not have needed to carry a loaded firearm in the first place. Finally, this
was an accident, so the adversity befell Pouncy without anyone intending to
cause him any harm. In the Stephens case, we can observe a similar pattern. She
lost her baby, which we can assume is an adversity. We have no evidence that
she desired her child’s death. I assume, for illustrative purposes, that things are
as the police allege and that this adversity was partially caused by her
wrongdoing.32 Sure, we might think that the speeding cop was the more
proximate cause, but that does not absolve Stephens. Her conduct was likely
still a but-for cause—but for Stephens’s negligence in securing the child, the
child would have survived. Finally, this was an accident, so no one who
contributed to the accident intended to cause Stephens or anyone else any harm,
much less retributive harm.
With the set of elements in view and with a couple of examples in tow,
the concept of natural punishment should be clearer. I further clarify the notion
in four ways. First, I distinguish my idea from a few others. Second, I
demonstrate that natural punishment takes a neutral view about the justification
of punishment. Third, I show that the notion of natural punishment does not
require anything supernatural or magical. Fourth, I consider the question of
whether natural punishment is real punishment. About this fourth task,
punishment theorists have adduced definitions of punishment that preclude
natural punishment, unless it were divine punishment. Responding to the
challenge from punishment theorists enables me to properly frame my project
of defining natural punishment.
A.

Other Thinkers on Natural Punishment

I am not the first theorist to write on natural punishment.33 Here, I
distinguish my version of the concept from versions advanced by Immanuel
30. For those who think that leaving the vigilante mob out as natural punishment is a mistake,
see infra Section IV.A.
31. See supra text accompanying notes 1–9.
32. As of the date of this Article, the fact of physical causation is unresolved. See Jacobo &
Schmitt, supra note 4.
33. The Chilean legal theorist Carlos Bobadilla Barra details a rich literature on the subject in
parts of the Spanish-speaking world. Carlos Bobadilla Barra, La “Pena Natural”: Fundamentos, Límites y
Posible Aplicación en el Derecho Chileno, 11 POLÍTICA CRIM. 548, 550–53 (2016) (Chile).
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Kant, by readers of John Locke, by Jacques Derrida, and by contemporary legal
theorist Doug Husak.
Immanuel Kant wrote of natural punishment and defined it as that which
occurs when “vice punishes itself.”34 Kant distinguishes this from forensic
punishment, that is, punishment by the courts.35 Kant’s natural punishment
notion is very close to my own, but there are two small ambiguities in his
account. Depending on how one resolves them, his account might be closer or
further from mine. In discussing these ambiguities, the aim is not to exposit
Kant, but rather to become perspicuous about my own account. In that spirit, I
turn to the ambiguities of Kant’s account. First, it is hard to be sure what Kant
means by vice. Vice is a term with moral valence in a way that the term I use,
wrongdoing, is not. For instance, conceptually speaking, some action A might
be a legal wrongdoing, even if A is morally commendable.36 On my
understanding of natural punishment, it is conceptually possible for an instance
of natural punishment to occur after someone commits such an action. It is not
clear that Kant can say this, for there was no vice in the normal, morally-charged
sense of the word. Second, Kant does not specify how vice punishes itself. On
my conception, there is a third element, namely that the punishment comes
about without the intervention of anyone seeking to bestow retributive harm.
Kant does not specify whether vice may enlist others in its service to punish the
vicious one. My thought is that vice can only elicit natural punishment by
enlisting unwitting participants.
Moving from Kant to Locke, some readers of the Second Treatise on
Government refer to Lockean “natural punishment.”37 For these readers, natural
punishment is any extrajudicial punishment in the state of nature. This idea is
obviously distinct from my own. On my conception, all natural punishment is
extrajudicial, but not all extrajudicial punishment is natural.38
Next, I distinguish my conception from Derridean accounts that identify
natural punishment with the wrongdoer’s own strong feelings of remorse.39
Jacques Derrida saw himself as expounding upon the (rather scant and

34. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 105 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797).
35. Id. (explaining that judicial or juridical punishment (poena forensis) is to be distinguished from
natural punishment (poena naturalis), in which crime as vice punishes itself, and does not as such come
within the cognizance of the legislator).
36. This is not a slight to natural law theorists. Their view may be true; it just is not a conceptual
truth.
37. Locke himself never uses the phrase “natural punishment,” but there are readers who employ
this term. See, e.g., Andrew Dilts, To Kill a Thief: Punishment, Proportionality, and Criminal Subjectivity
in Locke’s Second Treatise, 40 POL. THEORY 58, 66 (2012).
38. See infra Section IV.A.
39. See 2 JACQUES DERRIDA, THE DEATH PENALTY 37–39 (Geoffrey Bennington & Marc
Crépon eds., Elizabeth Rottenberg, trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2016) (2015).
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ambiguous) account from Kant in the Metaphysics of Morals.40 While Derrida’s
account is interesting, the conception that I wish to investigate differs from his
in two respects. First, on my conception, natural punishment is not necessarily
“the intolerable suffering of a feeling of guilt.”41 Recalling the Pouncy case from
above,42 it demonstrates that natural punishment can encompass a wrongdoer’s
dismemberment.43 The more general point is that natural punishment, as
employed here, can encompass many sorts of adversity. Second, on my
conception, while natural punishment may include serious, purely psychical
harm,44 this is not the paradigmatic case. Paradigmatically, when the harm is
largely psychical, the natural punishment will frequently have to include
something else too, something more substantial, for lack of a better word. This
enables the adversity to fill the complex practical role that punishment does.
This combination of great psychical harm with something else is arguably met
in the case of Stephens who lost her infant due, in part, to her negligence.45 Of
course, none of the preceding should suggest that true remorse is a painless
affair. Remorse can quickly turn into other things like self-harm, but should
that eventuate, that would not be the extra oomph needed to make such harm
natural punishment. Instead, it would count as another divergence from my
account. Someone who intentionally self-harms out of remorse for her
wrongdoing does not produce natural punishment because natural punishment,
on my conception, requires a lack of intention to exact retributive harm.
Finally, I distinguish my account from a similar view on offer from Doug
Husak. Husak discusses what he calls the “already punished enough plea,” the
claim that “the contempt of the public” can be so stigmatizing that a wrongdoer
deserves some mitigation in punishment.46 Husak’s idea differs from my own
in at least two respects. First, contempt of the public may well be intended as
retribution for a wrong. When this is so, it cannot be natural punishment, for it
runs afoul of my third element, which requires that the adversity not be caused
by anyone’s intention to exact retribution on the wrongdoer. Second, the
phenomenon that Husak discusses is more limited than what I envision in that
he focuses on contempt of the public,47 while I consider various kinds of
adversity.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id. at 38.
See supra text accompanying notes 1–3.
Pun intended.
I thank Paul Butler for pressing me on this point.
See supra text accompanying notes 4–9.
Douglas N. Husak, “Already Punished Enough,” 18 PHIL. TOPICS 79, 82 (1990).
Id.
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Natural Punishment Does Not Require Magic

Natural punishment has affinities with ideas like karma or divine
punishment. In natural punishment and in these other ideas, we get adversity,
wrongdoing that causes the adversity, and no intervention by any human agent
seeking to exact retributive harm upon the wrongdoer. The difference is that
natural punishment does not require any supernatural forces or magic.
Natural punishment only requires that someone’s wrongdoing play a
causal role in her undoing and that the undoing not result from anyone seeking
retribution against the wrongdoer. Ensuring that these two causal relations hold
does not require a higher power or magical force. At this point, one might wish
to argue that it makes no sense to call this punishment unless someone or
something actively sought the adverse outcome. This is a worry considered in
the next section. For now, it should be clear that, whatever we call it, the
necessary causal relations can obtain without any magic.
To conclude this section, I consider the compatibility of the magical stuff
with natural punishment. I have established that natural punishment can occur
without magic, but is it possible that, after all, magic produces natural
punishment? I consider divine punishment and karma separately. Divine
punishment is ruled out from counting as natural punishment because it likely
fails the third element, about intending retributive harm. In paradigm cases of
divine punishment, the deity exacts retributive harm. Zeus sends down a
lightning bolt,48 or God turns people into pillars of salt.49 Karma provides a
more interesting case. Karma is a force that maintains the causal relations of
natural punishment, but karma does not intend those relations, for it is not
agential.50 As traditionally understood, karma is like the normative version of
Newton’s Third Law. Newton’s Third Law provides that for every action there
is an equal and opposite reaction.51 A bird’s wings push air downward, and the
air pushes back, upward, creating lift. With karma, when a person does wrong,
48. In Book XII of The Odyssey (lines 340–415), one finds that “Zeus thundered and hurled bolts
to strike the ship” of the men who stole and slaughtered cows of Helius. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 312–
14 (Emily Wilson ed. & trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 2018).
49. Popularly, it was God who turned Lot’s wife into the pillar of salt. See, e.g., Philip Goff,
Orthodox Property Dualism + The Linguistic Theory of Vagueness = Panpsychism, in 6 CONSCIOUSNESS
INSIDE AND OUT: PHENOMENOLOGY, NEUROSCIENCE, AND THE NATURE OF EXPERIENCE 75, 84
(Richard Brown ed., 2014) (“In the bible we hear that God turned Lot’s wife into a pillar of salt.”).
However, the passage in Genesis 19:26 does not say that God did anything to her; instead, the salty
transformation seems more like how I describe karma.
50. Philosopher Charles Goodman distinguishes traditional understandings of karma, which view
karma as a cosmic force, from modern understandings, which view it is as a psychological phenomenon.
On both understandings, karma is not agential. See Charles Goodman, Modern and Traditional
Understandings of Karma, in A MIRROR IS FOR REFLECTION: UNDERSTANDING BUDDHIST ETHICS
131, 131–45 (Jake H. Davis ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2017).
51. ISAAC NEWTON, THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 83
(Andrew Motte trans., Daniel Adee 1848) (1687).
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the world similarly pushes back. If a man unjustly enriches himself, one day he
will be impoverished. Nobody intends for the world to push back any more than
anyone intends for Newton’s Third Law to govern the universe; that is just how
things are. Karma, then, seems compatible with natural punishment.
C.

Natural Punishment Does Not Presuppose a Particular Justification of
Punishment

Next, I explain why natural punishment does not presuppose any
particular theory about the proper justification of punishment. This serves two
purposes. First, insofar as my view looks ecumenical, it should garner more
adherents. Second and more importantly, one misunderstands the phenomenon
if one views it as something that, say, only deterrence theorists could maintain.
In order to demonstrate that natural punishment and its attending practical
intuitions are ecumenical, I review six prominent theories about the proper
justification of punishment. For each, I explain how natural punishment might
satisfy the proffered end of punishment.
First, consider the rehabilitative or educational theory offered by many
thinkers from Plato onward.52 On this view, punishment is justified insofar as
it makes the wrongdoer a better person. On Plato’s view, wrongdoing results
from normative ignorance.53 Punishing someone teaches them right from
wrong. Natural punishment could plausibly perform this function, or at least,
perform it just as well as a term of imprisonment. At sentencing, the wrongdoer
would be told that her action was wrongful and that the adversities that she has
suffered should be an indication of the degree of wrongfulness of her actions. If
this all sounds too formalistic, I can remind the reader of Brittany Stephens, the
mother who lost her child in a car accident. It would be entirely normal for
someone like Stephens to say, after losing her child, that now she really sees
why we have these rules about car seat placement. If we ignore these rules,
tragedy can result.
Second, I turn to specific deterrence theories. As traditionally understood,
on this type of view, punishment is justified insofar as it deters the wrongdoer
in question from committing that wrong again.54 One can broaden the view to
52. See PLATO, THE LAWS bk. IX, at 860–64b (c. 348 B.C.E.); PLATO, GORGIAS 474, 476a–79c
(c. 380 B.C.E.) [hereinafter PLATO, GORGIAS]; PLATO, PROTAGORAS 323 passim (c. 380 B.C.E.);
MARY MARGARET MACKENZIE, PLATO ON PUNISHMENT 179–206 (1981); HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY
OF RIGHT 66–74 (Thomas Malcolm Knox trans., Clarendon Press 1952) (1821); Herbert Morris, A
Paternalistic Theory of Punishment, 18 AM. PHIL. Q. 263, 264 (1981); ROBERT NOZICK,
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 363–97 (1981); Jean Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of
Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 208, 209–12 (1984); Dan Demetriou, Justifying Punishment: The
Educative Approach as Presumptive Favorite, 31 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 2, 2–3 (2012).
53. PLATO, GORGIAS, supra note 52, at 476a–79c.
54. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 360 (C.K. Ogden ed., Harcourt Brace
Co. 1931) (1802); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
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claim that punishment is justified insofar as it prevents the wrongdoer in
question from committing that wrong again. The difference between the broad
and more traditional understandings is that one can prevent a wrongdoer from
reoffending in multiple ways; deterrence is one specific strategy—offering a
negative incentive. An incapacitating punishment prevents reoffending, but it
is not quite right to claim that it deters reoffending. Whether construed broadly
or narrowly, natural punishment can fulfill the role of making it less likely that
the wrongdoer reoffends.55 Pouncy, the wiener bandit, may well desist from
robbing people after his accident. Were his accident worse, he might have been
completely disabled from walking again and that natural punishment would
ultimately end his robbery days, whether he wanted it or not.
Third, I consider general deterrence theories. On this type of view,
punishment is justified insofar as it deters others—not the wrongdoer in
question—from committing the same wrong.56 At first glance, one might doubt
that natural punishment can serve as a general deterrent, for would-be criminals
might see natural punishment as the kind of thing that only befalls fools or the
ill-fated, not themselves.57 Or, to put the point more concretely, would-be
robbers might disregard the injuries sustained by Pouncy because people
typically keep their appendages intact while committing robberies. Even so,
while some will be inclined to “roll the dice,”58 others might reasonably see
natural punishment as a warning about what could happen to them. One is
unlikely to be detected and punished for stealing a bicycle,59 but it may well be
LEGISLATION (1789), reprinted in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1, 83 (John Bowring ed.,
Thoemmes Press 1962); JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF PENAL LAW (1843), reprinted in THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, supra, at 365, 396; JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 68–70
(Oskar Piest ed., Bobbs-Merrill Educ. Publ’g Co. 1957) (1861); H.J. McCloskey, A Non-Utilitarian
Approach to Punishment, in CONTEMPORARY UTILITARIANISM 239, 255–57 (Michael D. Bayles ed.,
1968); Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. IN AM. 1975–2025,
at 199, 201–02 (2013).
55. Some argue that the claim that natural punishment can specifically deter is “merely a
speculative observation.” Mirko Bagaric, Lidia Xynas & Victoria Lambropoulos, The Irrelevance to
Sentencing of (Most) Incidental Hardships Suffered by Offenders, 39 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 47, 78 (2016).
Fair enough, but this speculation is not demonstrably false, and, in cases where natural punishment
completely incapacitates the wrongdoer, the speculation is demonstrably true. Thus, if one is a specific
deterrence theorist, one can endorse natural punishment.
56. See Daniel M. Farrell, The Justification of General Deterrence, 94 PHIL. REV. 367, 367–68
(1985); JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 17 (8th ed. 2018); Russell L.
Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 857–58
(2002).
57. James Duffy, Roll the Dice, Rational Agent: Should Extra-Curial Punishment Mitigate an Offender’s
Sentence?, 31 U. QUEENSL. L.J. 115, 126 (2012).
58. Id.
59. See Casey Neistat, ‘Bike Thief,’ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/
03/13/opinion/bike-thief.html [https://perma.cc/34BM-ET8D (dark archive)] (explaining the author’s
“bike theft experiment” in which he locked up his own bike and proceeded to steal it using “brazen
means” in order to find out whether onlookers or law enforcement would intervene).
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that the penalty for bike theft deters some folks from engaging in this behavior.
In this way, natural punishment is no different from intentionally inflicted
punishment: both provide general deterrence but provide it imperfectly.
Fourth, I consider retributivism. Above, I spoke of retributivism in the
strong sense—that is, retributivism as a theory that justifies punishment by
adverting to just deserts.60 According to retributivists, wrongdoers simply
deserve some amount of hard treatment or deprivation for their wrongs.61
Because natural punishment can serve as that deprivation, it is consistent with
retributivism.62 As two prominent retributivists put it, “it may be that the
human practice of punishment relies on a combination of censure and suffering,
but what retributive desert itself requires is just the suffering.”63
Fifth, I turn to expressive or communicative theories of punishment. On
this type of view, punishment is justified to the extent that it communicates to
the wrongdoer (and perhaps also to the wider society) that the wrongdoer’s act
was wrong.64 While some respected voices have expressed doubt as to whether
natural punishment can play this communicative role,65 it surely can, provided
that natural punishments are adequately publicized and correctly framed by
authorities. For example, the Stephens tragedy, if widely publicized, would
undoubtedly communicate to society the danger of failing to properly secure a
car seat.

60. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
61. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE, at xix (John Ladd
trans., 1965) (1797); IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195 (W. Hastie trans., 1887) (“For
one man ought never to be dealt with merely as a means subservient to the purpose of another, nor be
mixed up with the subjects of Real Right. Against such treatment his Inborn Personality has a Right
to protect him, even although he may be condemned to lose his Civil Personality. He must first be
found guilty and punishable, before there can be any thought of drawing from his Punishment any
benefit for himself or his fellow citizens.”); Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475,
476–80 (1968); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 45–58
(1976); Michael S. Moore, Justifying Retributivism, 27 ISR. L. REV. 15, 21 (1993); MICHAEL S. MOORE,
PLACING BLAME 153–88 (1997).
62. For retributivists saying as much, see LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN,
REFLECTIONS ON CRIME AND CULPABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PUZZLES 200–04 (2018).
63. Id. at 182.
64. See Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397, 401–04 (1965); Jean
Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111, 129–33 (Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean
Hampton eds., 1988); Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution,
39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1691–92 (1992); R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 64–73, 254–62,
268–77 (1986); R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 80–83 (2001); M.
Margaret Falls, Retribution, Reciprocity, and Respect for Persons, 6 LAW & PHIL. 25, 45–46 (1987); Igor
Primoratz, Punishment as Language, 64 PHIL. 187, 188–91 (1989); Thaddeus Metz, Censure Theory and
Intuitions About Punishment, 19 LAW & PHIL. 491, 494–96 (2000); Joshua Glasgow, The Expressivist
Theory of Punishment Defended, 34 LAW & PHIL. 601, 602–11 (2015).
65. R.A. Duff, The Intrusion of Mercy, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 361, 367 n.16 (2007) (“[I]t is hard
to see how [natural punishment] could serve the ends of communicative punishment.”).
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Sixth and finally, I consider the reconstructive theory of punishment. On
this view, punishment is justified insofar as it reestablishes the empirical
validity of a community’s norm.66 When someone flouts the community’s norm,
the norm falls into doubt: it is unclear that the norm is operative, or as Kleinfeld
puts it, “actualized,” anymore.67 When the community punishes, it reestablishes
the norms as operative. Punishment not only communicates that the community
obeys this norm; punishment speaks that obeisance into being.68 Punishment is
a kind of performative, in J.L. Austin’s sense.69 Just as with the expressive
theories, I contend that natural punishment may fill this role, so long as it is
adequately publicized and correctly framed by authorities.
D.

Natural Punishment as Real Punishment

The final issue to consider is whether natural punishment is real
punishment. One might hold that real punishment is something intentionally
inflicted as punishment. Natural punishment, as I define it, is not like that. In
suggesting that natural punishment be considered as genuine punishment, I
seem to face substantial opposition, as noted philosophers70 and some courts71
have maintained that punishment must be intentionally inflicted. While there
have been some dissenters to the mainstream view,72 it appears that my proposal
faces an uphill battle on this weighty question. As I explain below, there is a
sense in which this Article takes a stand on the question, but there is another
sense in which I leave the question for nobler minds to ponder.73 To see this
requires making an important distinction.
66. See, e.g., Joshua Kleinfeld, Reconstructivism: The Place of Criminal Law in Ethical Life, 129
HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1545 (2016).
67. Id. at 1499 (“For example, the norm requiring that people respect one another’s physical
security is de-actualized when one person assaults another: though no less valid as an abstract,
conceptual matter, the norm no longer holds as a description of actual social arrangements.”).
68. Id. at 1513.
69. See J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 4–5 (J.O. Urmson & Marina Sbisà
eds., 2d ed. 1975) (isolating explicit performatives as utterances that are not true or false and that are a
part of an action which is more than simply saying something).
70. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 5 (2d ed. 1968) (asserting that
punishment “must be intentionally administered,” not accidental); Metz, Why We Welcome Poetic Justice
and Despair at Poetic Injustice, supra note 13 (claiming that natural punishment is not real punishment
because “[p]eople are undergoing harm or discomfort, but these bads are not being intentionally
inflicted by an agent to censure wrongdoing, a straightforward understanding of punishment”).
71. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1991); Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652–
53 (7th Cir. 1985).
72. Adam J. Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, 18 LEGAL THEORY 1, 7–10 (2012) [hereinafter
Kolber, Unintentional Punishment]; see also Donelson, Cruel and Unusual What?, supra note 28, at 33
(arguing on pragmatic grounds that negligent inflictions of harm should count as punishment for legal
purposes).
73. As I explain below, one could understand thinking about punishment as a purely theoretical
matter, as an attempt to understand the true nature of punishment. Interesting and ennobling as such
questions might be—Aristotle, for instance, suggests that the noblest objects of study are such purely
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There are two ways to understand the task of defining punishment. On
the one hand, one might conceive this task as an exercise in metaphysics; that
is, one might think that punishment names some abstract entity whose nature
courts and commentators should aim to discover. If defining punishment is
metaphysical, success in such inquiry depends on whether a proffered definition
accurately tracks this preexisting abstract entity. On the other hand, one might
conceive of defining punishment as a practical task; that is, one might think that
we ought to place certain phenomena into the category of punishment when
doing so has certain practical advantages like promoting justice. If defining
punishment is practical, success in such inquiry depends on whether a proffered
definition enables us to achieve the specified practical goals.
This Article is unconcerned with the metaphysics of punishment. Maybe
the true nature of punishment has an intent requirement, as Hart claimed,74 or
maybe Kolber is right that it doesn’t.75 Since this Article is not concerned with
the metaphysics of punishment, it cannot be an objection that it gets the
metaphysics wrong. If Hart is right about the metaphysics, that is no strike
against this defense of natural punishment.
As an aside, I note that it is not obvious why anyone should care about the
metaphysics of punishment in the first place. I would have thought that
punishment theorists are most concerned with the practical question of how to
order society. That certain abstract entities are such-and-so seems irrelevant.
Why should abstract entities dictate how we order society?76 Of course, if
punishment theorists were most concerned with writing a dictionary, perhaps
the metaphysics of punishment would matter, but since we are not
lexicographers, we should focus on offering the definition of punishment that
best advances our practical purposes.
I have digressed. As a practical matter, natural punishment should count
as punishment. Instead of proving this, I merely note that this seems to follow
from the practical intuitions mentioned at the outset: (1) that natural
punishment can be a proper response to wrongdoing and (2) that natural
punishment should be considered when deciding how much additional
punishment an offender warrants. These intuitions just amount to the claim
that we should treat natural punishment as punishment. To treat something as
punishment is to allow it to function in these two roles, as something that is a
proper response to wrongdoing and as something that can diminish our warrant
theoretical matters—this Article simply does not engage such questions. See ARISTOTLE,
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. X, at 1177a–1178a (Roger Crisp ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2014) (c. 350
B.C.E.).
74. HART, supra note 70, at 4–5.
75. Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, supra note 72, at 3.
76. Ronald Dworkin once pointed out the absurdity of this in his discussion of “morons.” Ronald
Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 87, 120 (1996).
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for inflicting punishment. Of course, these practical intuitions may be mistaken,
but the present project has assumed that they are correct.
E.

Summary

Part I of this Article has sought to clarify the idea of natural punishment.
Offering a reductive three-pronged definition began our foray into rendering
the idea more perspicuous. Differentiating my conception from other iterations
helped to further clarify the idea. I further elucidated the notion by
demonstrating the compatibility of natural punishment with widely-held
justificatory theories of punishment. In arguing that natural punishment is
entirely natural, as opposed to supernatural, I sought to make the idea clear in
a different sense. Ideas that conflict with basic tenets of science, as we currently
understand it, are not unclear in the sense of being ambiguous or
incomprehensible. Instead, accepting (or trying to accept) ideas that conflict
with the basic tenets of science necessarily introduces confusion and
incoherence into our thinking lives, since science is our best tool for navigating
the world. Finally, in explaining that my attempt to define natural punishment
is a practical, as opposed to metaphysical, inquiry, I sought to clarify and
contextualize the debate in which this Article engages.
II. NATURAL PUNISHMENT AS CONSTITUTIONAL PUNISHMENT
Having rigorously defined natural punishment, this part of the Article
elaborates on the proposal to treat natural punishment as constitutional
punishment. The theoretical agenda of this part, then, is to lay out the proposal,
make a few qualifications, and finally to roughly describe how the proposal
might be operationalized. This mere sketch of how operationalization might
happen leaves unresolved many thorny tactical questions, questions that are
carefully flagged later in the Article.77 Here, however, is the sketch.
A.

The Proposal

The proposal is that we treat natural punishment as constitutional
punishment. By this term, I mean that which should be considered punishment
for constitutional purposes.78
The U.S. Constitution mentions or alludes to punishment in many
provisions. As I have noted elsewhere, the word punishment and its cognates
only appear a few times in the Constitution, but the concept of punishment is

77. See infra Section IV.C.
78. Of course, one might use the term to denote “constitutionally permitted punishment,” but
that is not what I mean. Thanks to Alice Ristroph for helpfully pointing this out to me.
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ubiquitous.79 The Ex Post Facto Clauses limit Congress80 and the states81 in
their power to punish: no punishment for deeds that were not criminalized at
the time of action.82 The Double Jeopardy Clause,83 prevents, inter alia, multiple
punishments for the same offense.84 The Fifth Amendment announces more
procedural protections for defendants in criminal cases, such as the right against
self-incrimination,85 the right to indictment by grand jury in federal cases,86 and
the requirement of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.87 These
protections implicate punishment, since one distinguishes criminal from civil
cases, in part, by claiming that the former always threaten punishment.88 The
Sixth Amendment, which begins with “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,” has a
suite of procedural protections—the Speedy Trial Clause, the Confrontation
Clause, trial by jury, and the right to counsel.89 These implicate punishment for
the same reason: a mark of a criminal prosecution is the threat of punishment.
These various mentions and allusions together comprise constitutional
punishment. Constitutional punishment is that which cannot be cruel or
unusual, that which cannot be imposed through retroactive legislation, that
which cannot be imposed without the safeguards of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, and so on.
To treat natural punishment as constitutional punishment is to think that
an instance of natural punishment is subject to all constitutionally specified
constraints. For instance, if it would violate the Eighth Amendment to heap
intentional punishment on a wrongdoer after she has already suffered
79. Donelson, Cruel and Unusual What?, supra note 28, at 3–4.
80. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
81. Id. § 10, cl. 1.
82. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.) (“The prohibition considered
in this light, is an additional bulwark in favour of the personal security of the subject, to protect his
person from punishment by legislative acts, having a retrospective operation. I do not think it was
inserted to secure the citizen in his private rights, of either property, or contracts.” (emphasis omitted));
see also Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981) (“The ex post facto prohibition forbids the Congress
and the States to enact any law ‘which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the
time it was committed; or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed.’” (emphasis added)
(footnote omitted) (quoting Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 326 (1866))).
83. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
84. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 106 (2003) (“Under this Clause, once a defendant is
placed in jeopardy for an offense, and jeopardy terminates with respect to that offense, the defendant
may neither be tried nor punished a second time for the same offense.”).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
86. Id.
87. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute
the crime with which he is charged.”).
88. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil
Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 780–82 (1997); Susan R. Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-Civil
Boundary, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 679, 685–86 (1999) (explaining that American criminal law
paradigmatically punishes).
89. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
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considerable natural punishment, the intentional punishment should be
withheld. If that intentional punishment is not withheld, the wrongdoer should
receive whatever relief is proper for those who suffer Eighth Amendment
violations.
B.

Qualifying the Proposal

At this point, some qualifications are in order. While the proposal can be
sloganized as “natural punishment is constitutional punishment,” this, in truth,
is a little too broad. The actual proposal is that we should treat some natural
punishment as constitutional punishment. As demonstrated below, the proposal
must be qualified in several ways to make it more plausible.90 For now, I focus
on just two conditions: (1) the natural punishment must result from legal
wrongdoing, specifically crimes, and (2) the natural punishment must be
discovered by the state. Only when both conditions are met should we consider
a case of natural punishment as constitutional punishment.
On the first condition, there are many sorts of wrongs. There are legal
wrongs, as well as aesthetic wrongs,91 moral wrongs,92 prudential wrongs,93 and
so on. Of legal wrongs, there are torts and crimes. The proposal only concerns
those natural punishments resulting from crimes. I limit the proposal to legal
wrongs because it would be implausible to think that some other type of
misdeed that does not contravene the law should suddenly implicate the
Constitution and its protections. I also limit my proposal to the criminal class
of legal wrongs. I do because my proposal ultimately asks courts to temper the
amount of intentional punishment it would otherwise bestow; the proposal
must concern the types of wrongs that occasion punishment meted out by
courts, and those wrongs are largely crimes.94

90. See infra Part III.
91. See, e.g., GREEN BOOK (Participant Media et al. 2018).
92. See, e.g., id.
93. See, e.g., id.
94. There is the special case of punitive damages. Punitive damages are, as the name implies, a
kind of punishment, but one that follows tortious, not (necessarily) criminal, conduct. Thus, punitive
damages are another kind of punishment meted out by courts. In limiting the application of my
proposal to those natural punishments that follow crimes, I explicitly do not propose that courts
discount a tortfeasor’s punitive damages because of a natural punishment she might have suffered. I
leave out this special case, not because of any opposition to such discounts. In fact, this Article takes
no stance on whether such discounts are appropriate. Instead, that situation seems sufficiently
disanalogous to the situation I consider that it just seems to warrant separate treatment. The most
obvious disanalogy concerns the different effects of reducing intentionally inflicted punishment in the
two cases. If the courts decide to send someone to jail for less time, in principle, no one is better or
worse off. However, if the courts decide not to give a plaintiff punitive damages, that plaintiff is
rendered worse. Maybe punishment discounting is still, ultima facie, the right thing to do in the punitive
damages area, but this disanalogy should make it clear that such a situation raises new, hard questions.
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As a second condition, I propose that natural punishment be discovered
by the state in order to count as natural punishment. How an instance of natural
punishment comes to count as constitutional punishment is elaborated below.95
Suffice it to say for now that not all natural punishment, even when concerned
with a crime, is automatically constitutional punishment. Rather, the proposal
is that, upon discovering a case of natural punishment—limited to crimes, of
course—the state should treat that punishment as constitutional punishment.
C.

How It Works

The preceding has been painfully abstract. This section explains, with
more concrete details, how this proposal would work on the ground. A real-life
case of natural punishment will prove helpful for illustration.
Isaiah John Gellaty went nowhere fast. In Happy Valley, Oregon, Gellaty
stole a car and led police on a colorful chase.96 After police had flattened the
car’s tires, Gellaty began losing control of the vehicle.97 Gellaty artfully bailed
out of the car, which was still in motion, and took off on foot. However, he took
an unfortunate path: he tried to run in front of the car, which was still in
motion.98 The car hit him, breaking his leg and pinning him against a wall.
Police found him there moments later.99
If the proposal of this Article were accepted, the criminal process would
proceed as normal with an initial investigation, followed by arrest, the filing of
charges,100 and so on. There would be the typical pretrial motions: Gellaty’s
attorneys would seek to exclude various things from evidence and so on.
Supposing that the case progressed to trial, a trial would take place as normal
with the factfinder aiming to discover whether Gellaty committed the wrongs
of which he was accused.
The sentencing stage is where my proposal would make the most obvious
difference. During a sentencing hearing, the defense would mention the fact
that Gellaty had already faced natural punishment for his legal wrongdoing and
that this should entitle him to some punishment discount. If the court is
persuaded that this natural punishment did occur, it must take this into account
when levying his sentence. For instance, suppose there is a maximum sentence
95. See infra Section II.C.
96. Alleged Thief Tries To Escape Cops, Gets Pinned by Car He Was Driving, INSIDE EDITION
(Nov. 25, 2018), https://www.insideedition.com/alleged-thief-tries-escape-cops-gets-pinned-car-hewas-driving-48703 [https://perma.cc/D7FJ-NSAS].
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. As a small wrinkle, one might suspect that prosecutors may decline to file charges where a
natural punishment has occurred, due to sympathy for the criminal or due to the likelihood that no
intentional punishment will be imposed. For discussion of that latter possibility, see infra Section
IV.C.3.
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for Gellaty’s crimes, car theft and resisting arrest. If that were, say, five years
of incarceration, Gellaty should not receive that full sentence. Instead, he
should receive some reduction because of the natural punishment.
If Gellaty does not receive a reduction, even after persuading the court
that natural punishment occurred, he would have grounds for appeal. He could
claim that he has received a larger punishment than the criminal statute
permitted, a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.101 He may alternatively claim
that the punishment would violate his Eighth Amendment right against cruel
and unusual punishment, a right implicated when, inter alia, punishment is
excessive.102
When the process works well, without need for appeal, the sentencing
court would announce that the natural punishment is part of the official
sentence. This formal acknowledgement that a given instance of natural
punishment shall count as punishment for legal purposes is what I call an
embrace of the natural punishment. Only when natural punishment is formally
embraced can we call it constitutional punishment. My proposal, to be clear, is
that the state ought to embrace natural punishment when said punishment
meets a few conditions, like that the adversity faced was caused by the
defendant’s commission of a legal wrong.103
In our increasingly bureaucratized world, the model of a full trial followed
by an elaborate sentencing hearing where parties hash out a sentence is a little
out of step, except in the most serious of cases.104 In plenty of other instances, a
criminal case will not make it to a full trial. Also, in plenty of jurisdictions, I
imagine that the legislative and executive branches will not leave natural
punishment matters to judges alone; the other branches will want to issue
guidelines.
On the first departure from the full-dress trial, there will be plea
bargaining. Even where there is plea bargaining, on my proposal, there should
101. See Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401 (1937) (“The Constitution forbids the
application of any new punitive measure to a crime already consummated, to the detriment or material
disadvantage of the wrongdoer. . . . It is for this reason that an increase in the possible penalty is ex
post facto . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).
102. The first Supreme Court case to hold that punishment might be excessive for a particular
offense was Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
103. As an aside, the formal embrace of natural punishment may help it serve as a general deterrent.
When someone does something bad, they suffer natural punishment, and no one hears of it, would-be
offenders do not get the message that wrongdoing might have serious consequences for them. The
formal embrace broadcasts the fact of natural punishment, and conceivably, this may have just as much
an effect on would-be wrongdoers as hearing about a “normal” sentence.
104. NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE IT 5 (2018), https://
www.nacdl.org/getattachment/95b7f0f5-90df-4f9f-9115-520b3f58036a/the-trial-penalty-the-sixthamendment-right-to-trial-on-the-verge-of-extinction-and-how-to-save-it.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A5DE-FQDB].
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be an embrace of the natural punishment when the judge signs off on the
sentence. Also, the bargained-to sentence should reflect the punishment
discount. Insofar as there is charge bargaining,105 and even fact bargaining,106
present in contemporary legal practice, there will likely be bargaining over
which natural punishment has occurred. This raises a number of hard questions
about the integrity of the courts, but those questions are not specific to my
proposal; rather, they are raised any time charge or fact bargaining is present.
On the second departure, there likely will be interventions from the
legislative or executive branches to standardize the use of natural punishment
discounts. Perhaps these will purport to be binding. If so, this can also raise
hard questions, such as whether a binding punishment discount would unduly
and unconstitutionally constrain the judiciary in carrying out its distinct
constitutional duty.107 This sort of concern, like the precise contours of plea
bargaining under my proposal, is beyond the scope of the present effort.
III. THREE PUZZLES
Having explained the proposal that we treat natural punishment as
constitutional punishment, this part of the Article explores the consequences of
that proposal by examining three puzzles: those raised by (1) the Eighth
Amendment protection against excessive punishment; (2) the Due Process
protections against pretrial punishment; and (3) the protection against double
jeopardy. In raising and resolving the following three puzzles, I further refine
the proposal and demonstrate that natural punishment can be incorporated into
American law without too much disruption. The puzzles concern how one
would interpret and apply three constitutional protections if natural
punishment were understood as constitutional punishment.
A.

Excessive Punishment

The first puzzle concerns the Eighth Amendment protection against
excessive punishment. The Eighth Amendment requires, inter alia, that
punishments be proportional, not excessive, given the culpability of the
wrongdoer and the degree of the wrong.108 When a punishment would be
excessive, a convict merits injunctive relief or, if the punishment has already
transpired, some sort of damages. Natural punishments are not typically subject
to injunctive relief, and it is counterintuitive that the state should pay damages
for punishment it does not inflict. The puzzle is how the Eighth Amendment
protections can apply in the case of unduly harsh natural punishment.
105. Id. at 25.
106. Id. at 26.
107. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005) (holding that federal sentencing
guidelines are advisory, not mandatory).
108. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380–82 (1910).
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Before solving this puzzle, I first explain the meaning of excessive
punishment under American constitutional law. Then, with an example, I
explain how the prohibition on excessive punishment appears to cause problems
for my proposal.
Without knowing anything about the law, it seems that punishment could
be excessive in three ways. First, the punishment could be too much given the
crime. Fifty-odd years in prison is too severe for selling a bottle of whiskey
without a license.109 However, fifty years may be appropriate for defrauding
thousands of people out of millions of dollars.110 Second, the punishment could
be too much, given the person. A mandatory life sentence with no possibility of
parole is too severe for a child.111 However, mandatory life without parole may
be appropriate for an adult.112 Third, a punishment could be too much simpliciter.
In other words, no person, no matter what they did, should receive said
punishment. Some view the death penalty like that.113 Others think the same of
brutal forms of corporal punishment.114 This third category, in a way, collapses
into the other two. For all three (or two) kinds of excess, punishment involves
too much of something relative to some standard set by the person or the crime
committed. With this understanding in mind, let us turn to an example to
illustrate how the prohibition on excessive punishment comports with my
proposal.
Ernest Johnson should have left his estranged wife alone; there was
protective order telling him to do as much.115 In Fall 2018, Johnson violated the
order and went to the home that his estranged wife shared with her new
boyfriend—with a Molotov cocktail in hand. Johnson hurled the cocktail at the
door, hoping to set the house ablaze, but instead, it bounced back at him,
engulfing the forty-three-year-old man in flames.116

109. O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 340 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
110. Diana B. Henriques, Madoff Is Sentenced to 150 Years for Ponzi Scheme, N.Y. TIMES (June 29,
2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/30/business/30madoff.html [https://perma.cc/F4JA-BW5
H (dark archive)].
111. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012).
112. For example, Terry Nichols, who received 161 terms of life without parole for his involvement
in the Oklahoma City bombing. Oklahoma Plotter Given Life Term, BBC NEWS (Aug. 9, 2004, 12:09
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3549574.stm [https://perma.cc/TAK3-DFLD].
113. See generally Arthur Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty
Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773 (1970) (arguing that the death penalty is unconstitutional
because it amounts to cruel and unusual punishment).
114. See, e.g., Amanda Clift-Matthews & Parvais Jabbar, Singapore Should Be Ashamed of Lashings,
DEATH PENALTY PROJECT (Sept. 3, 2020), https://www.deathpenaltyproject.org/singapore-shouldbe-ashamed-of-lashings/ [https://perma.cc/B3QB-HFU6] (decrying Singapore’s brutal use of caning).
115. Michelle Hunter, Man Burned While Trying To Set Fire to Home of Estranged Wife’s Boyfriend:
JPSO, NOLA.COM (Oct. 16, 2018, 8:15 PM), https://www.nola.com/crime/2018/10/man_burned_
while_trying_to_set.html [https://perma.cc/4U2K-3T43].
116. Id.
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Johnson clearly received natural punishment, as all three elements were
easily satisfied. First, he faced adversity, for he incurred severe burns on sixty
percent of his body.117 Second, the adversity was caused by his own wrongdoing,
that is, violating the protective order and attempting arson. Finally, the
adversity had nothing to do with anyone seeking retribution against him.
I propose that we treat instances of natural punishment as constitutional
punishment. If we do so in this case, we seem to face a problem. These severe
burns seem excessive under the Eighth Amendment. Violating the order and
attempting arson are serious offenses, but they do not seem to warrant lifethreatening burns all over one’s body. Thus, if we treated Johnson’s natural
punishment as constitutional punishment, his Eighth Amendment rights seem
to be violated. If so, he would be entitled to some relief—but injunctive relief
is impossible, given that he has already been burned. Giving him a punishment
credit on which he could draw for future offenses seems patently ridiculous, as
the philosopher Claudia Card has observed.118 The only other option seems to
be damages, yet it also seems implausible to pay this man for going out and
turning himself into a campfire. What to do? Must the response be to
compensate this wrongdoer or to retract the proposal?
There may be a way to accept the proposal that natural punishment is
constitutional punishment while limiting the application of the proposal to
avoid cases with an implausible result. I begin with the suggestion to think of
natural punishment’s harm as divisible into parts of unpleasantness, into what
one might call “disutiles.”119 A punishment is excessive only if there are too
many disutiles for a given crime, for a given person, or for any person or
crime.120 I further suggest to think of our practical intuition to treat natural
punishment as constitutional punishment as the practical claim that the state
should embrace the disutiles of natural punishment as disutiles given by
constitutional punishment. But I urge a limit. For natural punishments, the
state can embrace, at maximum, the highest amount of disutility that the
Constitution permits.
The burning of Johnson, let us conjecture, is one hundred disutiles. For
the crimes that he has committed, the state may at most inflict fifty disutiles.
Anything over the fifty disutiles is not punishment that the state can embrace
as its doing and, thus, anything over the fifty disutiles is not constitutional
punishment.
This solution may appear to create another problem by allowing the state
to decide to embrace only five disutiles that the burning causes and then decide
117. Id.
118. Claudia Card, On Mercy, 81 PHIL. REV. 182, 201–02 (1972).
119. For use of this terminology, see Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 182, 229 (2009).
120. If there were totally off-limits punishments, this analysis may not work.
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to inflict forty-five through intentional punishment. I would block this, for the
limit should also be a floor.
At this point, I have gestured at a solution to the puzzle. For those natural
punishments that are, all by themselves, constitutionally excessive, we can
divide them into two portions. One portion is the limit that the Constitution
allows, and the other is the excess. The state should embrace the first portion;
it cannot embrace the excess. Thus, one can accept the proposal to treat natural
punishment as constitutional punishment without the counterintuitive result
that the state owes damages for excessive natural punishments.
Neat as this response may sound, it might also seem ad hoc. There is,
however, precedent for such thinking in American law. There once was a time
when Eighth Amendment suits worked very differently than today.121 When,
for instance, an inmate claimed that he faced some cruel punishment in prison
at the hands of a prison official, courts would first figure out whether the
complained-of behavior was in fact cruel punishment.122 If it were, this did not
mean that the inmate could sue the prison or the state. The state had sovereign
immunity that may not have been waived.123 Instead, it meant that the prison
official was acting beyond her state-granted authority. Since the state had no
authority to license the prison official to violate the Constitution, the official’s
behavior was not the state’s act.124 This left the inmate free to sue the official
for the ordinary tort that occurred such as battery. When such a suit would
proceed, the official could not use her position as a defense.125
This system was eventually replaced by our modern system that allows
courts to see officials’ illegal behavior as the state’s misdeeds.126 The modern
system has net benefits; in particular, it helps victims recover against judgmentproof, poor government officials.127 Nonetheless, the reasoning of the old
system is not faulty and would be fine in a world with more insurance or without
judgment-proof people. Regardless of the merits of the old system, the point is
only that American legal thought has previously upheld the idea that we cannot
typically attribute unconstitutional measures to the state. That thought is the

121. Raff Donelson, Who Are the Punishers?, 86 UMKC L. REV. 259, 279–80 (2017).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. For a description of this process, see id.
126. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Bidding Farewell to Constitutional Torts, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 933,
935–37 (2019) (describing the history of constitutional torts and their rise since the 1970s).
127. See Stephen Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603, 607–09 (2006)
(describing the widespread problem of judgment-proof defendants); Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart
Shwab, Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 643–44 (1987) (differentiating
between civil rights litigation and constitutional torts litigation and identifying state responsibility for
damages as one main difference).
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core of my resolution of the first puzzle, and as such, it is not grossly out of step
with American legal thought.
B.

Pretrial Punishment

The second puzzle concerns Due Process protections against pretrial
punishment. Due Process requires, inter alia, that punishments be withheld
until a court pronounces guilt upon a criminal defendant.128 Natural
punishments typically occur well before a court adjudicates the issue in
question. This appears to violate the Due Process guarantee, and yet, like in the
Eighth Amendment puzzle, no relief seems plausible.
To begin solving the second puzzle, consider a different pretrial matter.
In many jurisdictions, if a person is held in jail prior to conviction and is later
convicted, the time served in jail is counted against the sentence time.129 For
instance, suppose that someone—call her Amy—is held in jail for one year prior
to her conviction for a crime. After her conviction, Amy is sentenced to five
years in prison. In many jurisdictions, Amy will only have to serve four years,
since she already spent one year in jail. Now, something should be very puzzling
about this. The pretrial detention was not punishment while Amy was awaiting
trial. If it were, the detention would have violated the Due Process guarantee
that one will not face punishment before trial.130 After conviction, the pretrial
detention is somehow transformed into a period of punishment. If it were not
so transformed, it is hard to see what would justify counting the one year of
detention against Amy’s sentence.
The “mystery of credit for time served,” as some like to call it,131 may
prompt various sorts of responses. I rely on this situation to suggest a particular
lesson, namely that the American legal system sometimes allows these time
transformations. In such time transformations, before a certain point in time, a
particular harm is not legal punishment, but after that point in time, that very
same harm, that already happened, is legal punishment. I suggest that we think
about natural punishment similarly.
128. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (“[U]nder the Due Process Clause, a detainee may
not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.”).
129. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9760 (2021); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-23-101(c) (LEXIS
through the 2021 1st Extraordinary and the 2021 Reg. Sess.); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-23 (LEXIS
through the 2021 Reg. Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.11(b) (2021); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18403 (2021).
130. Obviously, the Bill of Attainder Clauses stand for the proposition that one will not face
punishment prior to trial. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, § 10. cl. 1. But Due Process also encompasses
this principle as it has been part of the Anglo-American tradition for centuries. One can find the idea
expressed in Magna Carta: “No free man is to be arrested, or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or
exiled, or in any way destroyed, nor will we go against him, nor will we send against him, save by the
lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land.” MAGNA CARTA, ch. 39 (1215), reprinted in
DAVID CARPENTER, MAGNA CARTA 53 (David Carpenter trans., 2015).
131. Adam J. Kolber, Against Proportional Punishment, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1141, 1149 (2013).
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As highlighted above, my proposal is that we think of some instances of
natural punishment as constitutional punishment. Above, I noted that natural
punishment resulting from moral wrongs (that are not also legal wrongs) should
not be considered constitutional punishment. At this juncture, I claim natural
punishment, even when resulting from a legal wrong, should not be considered
constitutional punishment immediately. Only after a court finds someone guilty
can we say that the person has received constitutional punishment.
The justification for thinking of natural punishment in this way is
immanent. We should think of natural punishment like this because it coheres
with our other punishment practices, particularly our practice of counting
pretrial detention against someone’s official sentence. I can go one step further
though. Natural punishment is not merely similar to that other pretrial practice;
pretrial detention before a rightful conviction just is natural punishment, for it
is (1) an adversity, (2) caused by wrongdoing and (3) not caused by an intention
to exact retribution on the wrongdoer.
There might be a concern about the third element because officials detain
wrongdoers prior to a criminal trial because it is thought helpful for eventually
exacting retribution. This is true, but I would urge drawing a distinction here.
Criminal suspects are detained, not to exact retribution, but rather to ensure
their appearance at trial.132 That is the intention we must impute to criminal
justice officials, unless evidence suggests otherwise. Moreover, appearance at
trial is a precondition for exacting retribution, but aiming at a precondition for
x is not necessarily to aim at x. If it were, one would be rightly frustrated
whenever one merely secures the precondition but not x itself. This is not how
the criminal justice system works. The whole point of securing someone’s
appearance at trial is not frustrated by an acquittal.
In summary, the Due Process puzzle presents a dilemma: either think that
those who receive natural punishment get their Due Process rights violated and
deserve relief, which seems either impossible or implausible, or think that
natural punishment is not constitutional punishment at all. I resolve this puzzle
by claiming that natural punishment should not be considered constitutional
punishment until Due Process requirements are met. I further explained that
the American criminal justice system already accommodates such thinking.
C.

Successive Punishment

The third puzzle concerns the protection against double jeopardy. The
Double Jeopardy Clause133 prohibits, inter alia, inflicting multiple punishments
132. Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Propriety of Denial of Pretrial Bail Under Bail Reform Act (18
U.S.C.A. §§ 3141 et seq.), 75 A.L.R. Fed. 806, § 1 (1985) (“Risk of flight, by itself, is sufficient to merit
pre-trial detention.”).
133. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”).
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for a single offense.134 Natural punishments may conceivably occur long after
an offender has served her sentence. This appears to violate double jeopardy,
and yet again, no relief seems plausible. Before solving this puzzle, I first further
elaborate on its dimensions with an example.
Suppose that a Florida man, Brian, commits a minor traffic offense and
then, after being pulled over by police, unlawfully flees the scene. During his
flight, he scales a fence into someone’s yard and disturbs that person’s pet
alligator. Terrified of the beast, Brian opens a door in the fencing and continues
his flight. Little did Brian know that the alligator escaped the yard when he
opened that door. Brian is later apprehended, convicted, and duly sentenced.
After Brian has paid his debt to society, he encounters the same alligator and is
viciously attacked.135
Brian’s case looks like an instance of natural punishment, for he faced
adversity (the alligator attack), which was caused by his wrongdoing (the traffic
violation, fleeing police, trespassing), and not caused by any intention to exact
retribution (the alligator was not getting back at him for the criminal offenses).
The puzzle comes in determining whether to treat Brian’s natural punishment
as constitutional punishment.
My proposal is to treat cases of natural punishment as constitutional
punishment, but if this proposal were adopted, a problem seems to emerge. No
one is allowed to face multiple punishments for the same underlying offense,
per the Double Jeopardy Clause.136 Brian was already punished once when he
served his sentence, so he should not be punished a second time in the form of
natural punishment. If he were punished a second time, it would seem that
Brian should be entitled to damages. Of course, such relief seems implausible
to provide because the state, seemingly, should not be on the hook for alligator
attacks it does not cause.
Like with the previous puzzles, we can pose it as a dilemma: either provide
damages, which seems implausible, or admit that the proposal is incorrect. Like
with the previous resolutions, this task is to show how the proposal is consistent
with no provision of damages, at least most of the time.
Solving this puzzle requires, first of all, noting the circumstances in which
the practical intuition about natural punishment is most favorable to my
proposal. In those circumstances, a wrongdoer suffers serious natural
134. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498 (1984) (“[The Double Jeopardy Clause] protects against
multiple punishments for the same offense.” (quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977))).
135. This example draws inspiration from the real-life case of Bryan Zuniga. Zuniga really did
commit a traffic offense, flee, scale a fence, and encounter an alligator. Jake Carpenter, In Florida, Gator
Takes Bite Out of Crime—and Man, CNN (May 10, 2013, 4:21 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2013/05/10/
justice/florida-gator-arrest/index.html [https://perma.cc/XTL4-3AYJ]. The key difference is that he
was attacked shortly after the wrongdoing, not after he had served his sentence. See id.
136. Johnson, 467 U.S. at 498.
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punishment, and the state knows about this after it occurs but before sentencing.
Such circumstances activate the practical intuition that the state should take the
natural punishment into account when making its determination of the proper
amount of intentional punishment to bestow. Of course, in those circumstances,
the state is not a but-for cause of the natural punishment. Thus, the worry in
the alligator hypothetical cannot merely rest on the fact that the state did not
actually cause the attack. The state does not cause many instances of natural
punishment, and, at least sometimes, we still have the practical intuition that
the state should offer a punishment discount.
Instead of relying on causation, maybe our practical intuition rests on
time. If the natural punishment happens before sentencing or during someone’s
sentence, it seems fine to require the state to consider the natural punishment.
However, when the natural punishment happens after a sentence has already
ended, it seems unfair to ask the state to pay damages because it did not predict
the future. But what if the state could have predicted the future? My suggestion
is that our practical intuition about discounting does not rest on time per se.
Instead, it rests on whether the state knew (or should have known) that the
natural punishment did, or will, occur. Returning to the alligator case can help
to illustrate this point.
What seems implausible about compensating Brian for the alligator attack
is that, at the time of sentencing and even during the sentence, the state did not
know about the attack (because it had not yet happened), and the state could
not have foreseen the attack either. It is uncommon to be bitten by an alligator
in the first place.137 It is even more unlikely that the very same alligator that
Brian unwittingly released would be around to attack him later. If the situation
were different, such that the state could foresee the attack with perfect clarity,
it seems much more reasonable to insist that the state do something. As a first
matter, it should have tried to prevent the attack. Barring that, it should provide
a punishment discount. Failing that, damages should have been provided after
the attack.
This analysis of what should have happened is not just based on intuition;
existing caselaw provides some support for this line of thinking. The Court has
understood the Eighth Amendment to require prison officials to prevent certain
foreseen extrajudicial harms from befalling prisoners.138 The Court has tended

137. FLA. FISH & WILDLIFE CONSERVATION COMM’N, HUMAN-ALLIGATOR INCIDENTS
FACT SHEET (2019), https://myfwc.com/media/1776/human-alligatorincidentfactsheet.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LU8F-UL43] (“The likelihood of a Florida resident being seriously injured during an
unprovoked alligator incident in Florida is roughly only one in 3.1 million. From 1948 to 2019, 413
unprovoked bite incidents have occurred in Florida. Twenty-five of these bites resulted in human
fatalities.”).
138. This is a way to understand the secondhand smoke case. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S.
25, 33–35 (1993).
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to treat these foreseen harms—harms like particular instances of prisoner-onprisoner violence—as punishment for constitutional purposes.139 Because the
prisoner already had a sentence, the additional imposition of punishment is
deemed unconstitutional. If the state can foresee a natural punishment, just as
it sometimes can foresee other sorts of harms, what justification could it possibly
have for not discounting the punishment? It seems that no justification could be
consistent with the general practical intuition that we should discount
intentional punishment when the state knows about an instance of natural
punishment.
In closing, the last puzzle is resolved once one recognizes that the proposal
to treat natural punishment as constitutional punishment only applies in cases
where natural punishment is known or reasonably foreseeable by the state. Only
known or foreseeable natural punishments are those the state should have to
embrace. With this condition on the proposal, the instances where double
jeopardy would be violated should be relatively few. However, where double
jeopardy is violated, the wrongdoer deserves damages.
IV. LOOSE ENDS & FUTURE PROJECTS
Even after solving these constitutional puzzles, there are several
outstanding questions arising from my proposal that this Article does not
resolve. For instance, will prosecutors decline to press charges in cases where
natural punishment has occurred? Will such declinations, if they happen,
undermine certain persuasive justifications for punishment? What does my
proposal imply for those wrongdoers who receive unexpected benefits as a result
of their wrongdoing? These are all crucially important questions, and though
they all require their own systematic treatment, in this part, I flag these and
other questions for future consideration.
A.

Vigilantism and Other Events Verging on Natural Punishment

As a first matter, the category of natural punishment may seem artificially
narrow. There are other sorts of harm wrongdoers can suffer that, arguably,
should lead to punishment discounts too. For instance, my conception of natural
punishment excludes all adversities resulting from someone’s retributive aim.
As a result, a vigilante mob that attacks a wrongdoer does not, on the proposed
definition, inflict natural punishment. One might wonder why the recipient of
vigilante justice should get no punishment discount while others who suffer
extrajudicial harms do get such discounts. Similarly, one might wonder why the
person who intentionally punishes herself for her wrongs should get no
discounts.

139. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–34 (1994).
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To be clear, my proposal does not hold that punishment discounts should
only be extended to those who suffer natural punishment. Instead, it holds that
punishment discounts should at least be extended to those who suffer natural
punishment. Whether there is good reason to go further is beyond the scope of
the present inquiry. I suspect there may be good grounds for giving discounts
to more classes of persons, but my proposal simply does not grapple with this
for two reasons.
First, natural punishment, as I employ the term, tries to pick out the
familiar idea that a person might be punished even when no one sought to do
so. This idea can be reflected in American law without doing too much damage
to existing institutions and understandings. Whatever else one might want to
say about them, vigilantism and self-punishment are simply not instances of
this intuitive notion.
Second, self-punishment, in particular, raises complications such that it
might be less deserving of punishment discounts. I mention two of these below.
One complication concerns how to determine the severity of selfpunishment. A hypothetical may help to illuminate the problem. Suppose
someone claims that she locked herself at home for six months after she
shoplifted from a store to punish herself for the theft. Leaving aside the
question of proof that this occurred, how should a court assess the degree of
adversity? While the shoplifter might contend that this period was like six
months in a jail or six months of house arrest, that seems wrong (and selfserving) in part because her sojourn at home was completely under her own
control. She could release herself at any time.140 Part of the adversity of a
punishment, or at least incarceration, is that one must relinquish control of one’s
situation. To state the problem generally, it is hard to determine the degree to
which one can really punish oneself, and thus, we have a puzzle that does not
present for natural punishment, as defined here. This puzzle might be resoluble,
but its very existence as an extra puzzle suggests a reason for a separate analysis.
A second complication of self-punishment is whether the criminal justice
system should condone or incentivize this. If punishment discounts are
available, wrongdoers may feel incentivized to self-punish. This incentive might
be strong, especially if self-punishment is officially weighted much like other
punishment. A regime rife with self-punishment, however, may not be costeffective. To see why, consider again our hypothetical shoplifter. The
shoplifter’s misdeeds must reach the attention of the criminal justice system
somehow. Let us assume that the cost of discovery is the same whether or not

140. As an aside, this is also why Barbara Ehrenreich’s project of going undercover as a low-wage
worker, while revelatory, does not approximate the life of a low wage worker. BARBARA EHRENREICH,
NICKEL AND DIMED 10–12 (2001). Being poor means you cannot suddenly decide to leave your rags
and take up a jet-setting lifestyle as an internationally-renowned journalist and author.
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self-punishment occurred. Cost differences will always creep in at two stages:
during investigation into alleged self-punishment and during court proceedings
for reaching a determination about alleged self-punishment. Sometimes these
costs will be offset when self-punishment is actually proved, as a punishment
discount can be cost-saving for the public. But sometimes not. If the intentional
punishment was going to be a fine, punishment discounts will not be costsaving. If the self-punishment involves serious bodily harm, the state may need
to bear medical costs that far exceed costs for the appropriate intentional
punishment.
In mentioning these possible inefficiencies, the point is not merely that
giving punishment discounts for self-punishment might be a costly undertaking
and more costly than not having such discounts. Implementing my natural
punishment proposal will also be costly, and perhaps more costly than not
implementing it. The difference is that natural punishments just happen,
without anyone beckoning them as such. Therefore, when a natural punishment
happens, society faces one question: whether to acknowledge that something
has happened which can serve the purposes of punishment. With selfpunishment (and vigilante justice, too), society faces that and an additional
question: whether to encourage a kind of black market in punishment outside
of the normal channels—a black market that may make the whole enterprise
more expensive to run. Maybe the answer to that secondary question is yes, but
it is not obvious.141
My argument is not that vigilante violence and self-punishment deserve
no consideration from courts at sentencing time. Instead, I merely decline to
advance any position with respect to them. Part of the reason for declining is
that these phenomena simply lie beyond the scope of the pre-theoretical notion
I seek to capture and explore. Another part of the reason is that self-punishment
in particular raises hard questions that deserve separate scholarly treatment.
B.

The Flipside: Undoing Extra Benefits of Wrongdoing

In a nutshell, this Article proposes that, when crime naturally brings added
harm to wrongdoers, the wrongdoers deserve less punishment. One might
wonder about the obverse situation, when crime naturally brings added benefit
to wrongdoers.142 An example may help to fix ideas.

141. For argument that vigilantism should not lead to punishment discounts, see Bagaric et al.,
supra note 55, at 76–77.
142. I thank Mihailis Diamantis for this intriguing question and riveting conversation on this
matter.
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Mark Goodram and Jon-Ross Watson bought a winning ticket from the
British National Lottery.143 The payout for the winning ticket was to be four
million British pounds.144 However, the pair of pals purchased the ticket with a
stolen bank card, allegedly.145 Watson has a history of bank card fraud,146 but he
and his friend claim the ticket was purchased for them by a stranger named
John.147 Of course, they did not know John’s surname. Supposing for the sake
of the example that the facts are as alleged, this case presents a relatively minor
crime—stealing a few pounds on a stolen bank card—which improbably leads
to great rewards for the wrongdoers. One might wonder what should happen
here. Is this Article committed to an answer, namely giving extra punishment
to those wrongdoers, should they actually realize the winnings?
While it may seem that I should want to punish lucky wrongdoers more
harshly, this Article takes no stance on the matter. If one holds a deterrence
theory of punishment, indeed one may wish to heap extra punishment on
Goodram and Watson because they and others may come to believe that crime
pays and pays rather handsomely. By contrast, if one is a retributivist, the
answer may be the opposite. The wrong done to the bank card holder is no
worse because the thieves bought a winning lottery ticket than if they had
bought a losing ticket or even lollipops. A couple of quid is a couple of quid. If
this analysis is right, it suggests that what to do about lucky wrongdoers depends
on one’s justificatory theory of punishment. This Article is neutral on the
justification of punishment, so I leave this matter as a subject for another day.
C.

Thorny Quotidian Questions: Proof, Costs, and Declinations

While this Article has begun the task of thinking through how its proposal
would work on the ground,148 there is still much to be decided. Here, I flag
several questions of a rather practical and quotidian sort. Each of these are
questions that attend various sorts of proposals for legal change; as such, they
do not present special theoretical problems for my proposal. For that reason,
these questions do not call out to be settled at this early stage.
1. Proving Natural Punishment
The first matter concerns proving the existence of natural punishment.
One might think my proposal foists upon courts an insurmountable epistemic
143. Kate Buck, Lotto ‘Winner’ Denied £4,000,000 for Using ‘Stolen Credit Card’ Is Now Homeless,
METRO (May 5, 2019, 12:55 PM), https://metro.co.uk/2019/05/05/lotto-winner-denied-4000000-forusing-stolen-credit-card-is-now-homeless-9414431/ [https://perma.cc/2HFN-6BBG].
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See supra Section II.C.
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challenge. It should be remembered, of course, that in courts of law, finders of
fact are charged with discovering all manner of things: facts about the distant
past,149 facts about faraway places,150 facts about counterfactuals,151 and facts
about the inner recesses of a person’s mind.152 Still, it might be thought that
courts will have particular trouble with this new investigative task. Perhaps
courts will have trouble determining whether an adversity befell someone as a
result of their crime153 or have trouble determining whether retributive aims
caused the adversity. Courts may even have trouble determining whether the
wrongdoer suffered an adversity at all, especially when the alleged adversity is
psychical as opposed to physical or pecuniary.154 Just as an example, when an
infant is negligently left in a hot car and dies as a result, we might think that
the negligent parent has suffered a natural punishment,155 but it may well be
that the parent wished for this result or feels totally indifferent.
While I do not suspect it, the problem of proof may be thornier here than
in other areas of law. It may well be that special rules of evidence should be
devised. For instance, maybe to introduce psychical harms the defendant must
have formal documentation or an expert witness. More generally, the proposal,
as articulated so far, says nothing about the rules by which evidence of a natural
punishment will be admitted. Will it be the free-for-all of the sentencing phase,

149. Jerry Burns was tried for the murder of Michelle Martinko, which took place a full forty years
prior. Iowa Man Guilty in 1979 Killing of High School Student, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 24, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/ba3b951089561596d0cefe0954765ea8 [https://perma.cc/34R7-TDBL].
150. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 349–50 (1910) (considering events taking
place in the Philippines).
151. See, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 440–50 (1984) (establishing the inevitable discovery
exception to the Sixth Amendment exclusionary rule and thus calling on lower courts to determine
whether some evidence would have been discovered by legal means).
152. Any crime with a specific intent requirement would fit the bill here.
153. Mirko Bagaric and his co-authors demonstrate one difficulty of the causal inquiry when they
argue, tendentiously, that accidental physical injuries can never stand in the right causal relation to
crime to count as natural punishment. Bagaric et al., supra note 55, at 75–76. They say this because they
think that the fact of criminalization must cause the adversity, rather than thinking that the crime itself
must cause the adversity. Clearly, just trying to understand the causal question as a theoretical matter
is hard; finding the empirical facts that allow one to draw causal conclusions is harder still.
154. In talking about public opprobrium as a natural punishment, Bagaric and his co-authors
contend “it is not tenable to measure with any accuracy.” Id. at 49. In a later article, Bagaric and Peter
Isham claim that “public condemnation is impossible to quantify.” Mirko Bagaric & Peter Isham, A
Rational Approach to the Role of Publicity and Condemnation in the Sentencing of Offenders, 46 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 239, 241 (2019).
155. Sharon Otterman, He Left His Twins in a Hot Car and They Died. Accident or Crime?, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/01/nyregion/children-left-to-die-in-hotcars-accident-or-murder.html [https://perma.cc/XRG8-8JLX (dark archive)] (detailing the
phenomenon of hot car cases and the fact that prosecutors are hesitant to charge, and judges and juries
are reluctant to convict, because they feel that “[t]here’s nothing . . . that you are ever going to be able
to do to that parent that is going to come close to what that parent is going to have to live with for the
rest of their life”).
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as it exists in most U.S. jurisdictions today,156 or will something more formal be
required? Ultimately, this is all fodder for future work.
2. Fashioning the Discounts
A second matter that must be addressed in future work is fashioning the
punishment discounts that natural punishment affords those unlucky
wrongdoers. It might be thought that determining the discounts will be
particularly hard because the harms of natural punishment seem
incommensurate with the traditional harms imposed by courts, such as
imprisonment and fines. How many years in prison is a broken leg worth?
I agree that this will be a tough issue to tackle and further agree that this
issue will need to be resolved prior to implementing any natural punishment
proposal. Nonetheless, deferring that task is reasonable because the issue is
practically, not theoretically, taxing. We can have great faith that the issue can
be resolved since existing jurisdictions already have done so157 and because
criminal law already makes the incommensurable commensurable. While it may
seem weird to compare years in prison to broken legs, we already do that when
we sentence people to prison terms for breaking legs! Thus, without suggesting
any particular way to address this commensurability problem, I know that the
problem can be solved.
3. The Cost of Natural Punishment Determinations
A final matter concerns the cost of making natural punishment
determinations. Implementing any proposal will have costs, and a
thoroughgoing defense of a proposal should address those costs. Some readers
are, no doubt, wary about my proposal because they worry that this will be
expensive and may impose burdens on others in the criminal justice system (for
example, longer time to a final disposition for other criminal defendants). In
addition to this perennial question about proposals, there is a special cost
question for natural punishment.
Coming to a clear understanding of the costs may actually shape the
implementation of my proposal in at least two important ways: (1) it could help
courts define what counts as a sufficiently serious adversity, and (2) it will help
prosecutors decide when declining to prosecute is worth the lost benefits in
terms of general deterrence, communication, and reconstituting the
community.

156. For a comprehensive outline of the many ways states address sentencing, see ALISON
LAWRENCE, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, MAKING SENSE OF SENTENCING: STATE
SYSTEMS AND POLICIES (2015), https://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/sentencing.pdf [https://perma.
cc/3HA8-GM9E].
157. See infra Part V.
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On the first score, I have claimed that natural punishment must involve a
sufficiently serious adversity to warrant punishment discounts. One way to
measure sufficient seriousness is to make it a function of the disutility
experienced by the wrongdoer, the normal sentence for the crime, and how
much it costs society to investigate the alleged natural punishment. To see why
investigation costs matter for determining seriousness, consider the following:
If an alleged natural punishment harm is small and the cost of finding out is
small, this harm seems serious enough to investigate. On the other hand, if the
harm is small, but the cost of finding out is incalculably large, perhaps the
investigation should not proceed. To be clear, my proposal does not require
weighing investigation costs in order to measure seriousness of adversity, but
that is one reasonable implementation of the proposal, and it does require
gathering cost information.
On the second score—that knowing investigation costs will guide
prosecutors in declination decisions—this raises a number of issues about costbalancing. To bring these issues into focus, let us return to one of our initial
natural punishment cases, that of Brittany Stephens who lost her infant
daughter in a car accident. To be honest, I was surprised that Baton Rouge
prosecutors brought a case against Stephens for negligent homicide because she
is very sympathetic and a jury could nullify.158 Nonetheless, they decided to
charge her, but how might this charging decision be different in a world with
natural punishment discounts? Prosecutors might think about the fact that her
natural punishment could very well completely discount any intentional
punishment. Some may wish to charge and carry the process to its end, even if
no punishment will ultimately be dispensed because the full, formal process of
conviction followed by a formal embrace of the natural punishment will advance
various objectives of the criminal justice system, such as deterring others from
wrongdoing, communicating that Stephens’s act was wrong, and re-stitching
the social order, thereby making our traffic laws empirically valid again. Some
prosecutors, on the other hand, will find the full-dress procedure a waste of
money if it results in no further punishment from the state. What a prosecutor
will do in any individual case or as a general strategy follows from how she
balances costs. How much do we value the communicative element of
embracing a natural punishment and what is the opportunity cost of that?
Implementing my proposal would require both details of the costs of
implementation and guidelines for prosecutors to use in balancing costs.
D.

Justifying the Natural Punishment Intuition

Last, but most important, this Article devotes little space to defending the
general intuition that society should offer punishment discounts to those who
158. And maybe should nullify.
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suffer natural punishment. The bulk of that offered concerns the compatibility
of natural punishment with several well-known justifications of punishment.159
This discussion was included mainly to further explain the concept of natural
punishment, not to convince anyone (e.g., retributivists and deterrence
theorists) that they must accept my proposal.
Where natural punishment doctrines already exist, some scholars protest
them.160 Some American courts have even treated natural punishment as a
reason to increase punishment.161 Another particularly troublesome worry is the
thought that instituting my proposal could lead to unjust results: criminals with
prestige or power to lose might, because of those advantages, be enabled to seek
greater punishment discounts than their less esteemed, powerless peers. Call
this the Brock Turner problem.162 (While Turner did not receive his light
sentence due to any natural punishment he faced, one can imagine a nearby
possible world in which a natural punishment argument influences a judge who
is overly sympathetic to upper-class White male offenders.) The Brock Turner
problem can be addressed—we just have to think through how much discretion
judges should have with respect to sentencing discounts163—but that is not to
say it will be easy to do so in practice.
The Article has assumed that treating natural punishment as genuine
punishment is not merely a permitted outcome, but actually a requirement of
justice. This assumption will ultimately need quite a bit of justification. In
detailing the proposal and explaining how it would work before offering a robust
normative argument in its favor, I seem to have put the cart before the horse.
That is a reasonable objection to my approach, but my approach is undergirded
by the Kantian principle that ought implies can.164 In other words, we must know
what is possible, including how things work in order to know about our
obligations. With this Article, we know that, without doing any damage to the
American legal system, we can institute my proposal. In future work, we might
learn more about why we ought to.

159. See supra Section I.C.
160. See generally Bagaric et al., supra note 55 (arguing that wrongdoers who face natural
punishment should, by and large, receive no punishment discounts).
161. Bagaric & Isham, supra note 154, at 258 (discussing a time when the Tennessee Supreme
Court held that natural punishment, in the form of public contempt, was “an appropriate—even
desired—justification for a sentence increase”).
162. Turner was a Stanford undergraduate student convicted of sexual assault, but a judge
sentenced him to just six months of incarceration. See Kristine Ruhl, Are We Contradicting Ourselves?:
How the Stanford Rape Case Illustrates the Conflict Between Mandatory Sentencing and Judicial Discretion,
22 LOY. PUB. INT. L. REP. 28, 28–29 (2016).
163. I flagged this concern above. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
164. IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON ALONE 43 (Theodore M.
Greene & Hoyt H. Hudson trans., Harper & Row 1960) (1793) (“[D]uty demands nothing of us which
we cannot do.”).
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No doubt, even after scholarly work is done on the justificatory front, this
proposal is likely to be controversial in America. Ours is a nation that cannot
find a problem for which “more punishment” is not deemed the correct
answer.165
V. A FORAY INTO COMPARATIVE LAW
In raising and resolving the constitutional puzzles and carefully exploring
the loose ends in previous parts, this Article demonstrates that the natural
punishment idea can be incorporated into American law without requiring
anything too revolutionary. Existing caselaw and established understandings
point the way. Still, an American reader might have reservations and worry that
operationalizing this sort of proposal would create chaos. In this part, I attempt
to allay such worries by discussing three foreign jurisdictions that have already
adopted a natural punishment doctrine into their respective bodies of law.
Germany, Sweden, and Australia—all well-ordered, prosperous nations—
each offer punishment discounts where someone suffers natural punishment.
To be sure, each of these nations handles natural punishment in a slightly
different way, and each nation’s doctrine differs from my own proposal in
important respects. This diversity in thought, however, is welcome. It
highlights that there are several workable ways to operationalize the natural
punishment intuition.
A.

Germany

German law recognizes natural punishment by statute.166 The statute,
Section 60 of the Strafgesetzbuch (or Penal Code), permits a special disposition
of cases called the Absehen von Strafe disposition (literally, the “refraining from
punishment” disposition).167 When a court disposes of a criminal case in this
way, the defendant is “found guilty of an offense and yet not punished” at all.168
This disposition is appropriate when the defendant has already “suffered severe
losses due to their own misdeeds.”169
German law differs from my own proposal most dramatically in how
restricted it is. First, as noted above, the disposition is only available when the
natural punishment is thought to suffice. My own proposal contemplates an
embrace of natural punishment, even when the wrongdoer has not already
165. Even people complaining about the excesses of the criminal justice system seem to think the
answer lies in more arrests, but arresting cops instead.
166. STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 60, translation at https://germanlawarchive.
iuscomp.org/?p=752#60 [https://perma.cc/ET8F-WB8E] (Ger.).
167. Id.
168. Raymond H.C. Teske, Jr. & Hans-Jörg Albrecht, Prosecution and Sentencing Patterns in the
Federal Republic of Germany, 2 INT’L CRIM. JUST. REV. 76, 94 (1992).
169. Id.
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suffered enough. Second, the German Absehen is only available for “full”
adults.170 German law treats young adults and children quite differently from
full adults; generally, punishments are less severe for youth.171 Perhaps because
punishments are less severe for youth in the first place, this special disposition
is not thought to be necessary. My proposal does not contemplate age cutoffs.
Third, under German law, this disposition “can be invoked only if the penalty
that would have been assessed is imprisonment for a period of one year or
less.”172 In other words, the German Absehen is reserved for less serious crimes.
Due to these various restrictions, this disposition is little used. One study found
that out of 2,861 adults found guilty of robbery in Germany in 1992, only two
got the Absehen disposition.173
B.

Sweden

Swedish law also recognizes natural punishment by statute.174 Section 5 of
Chapter 29 in the Swedish Penal Code (“SPC”) provides several grounds for
discounting intentional punishment. These include instances in which “the
accused sustained serious bodily injury as a result of the offence” and cases
where “the accused would suffer detriment because they would be, or it can be
assumed that they would be, dismissed or given notice of termination from their
employment, or suffer other impediments of exceptional difficulties in their
professional or business activities.”175 Explicitly, the SPC contemplates that
someone who suffers natural punishment may already be punished enough.176
The Swedish approach to natural punishment is similar to my proposal in
a few respects. As a first observation, both have wide application. Adults and
juveniles can benefit from this provision; it is available for serious crimes and
less serious crimes; and it can offer partial or total punishment discounts. Both
allow many sorts of harms to count as natural punishment. From the passages
quoted so far, it may seem that the SPC only recognizes physical and pecuniary
harms as natural punishments, but the SPC includes a catchall phrase—
punishment discounts are licensed when there is “any other circumstance [that]
requires that the accused receive a lower penalty than that warranted according

170. Id.
171. Vincent Schiraldi, In Germany, It’s Hard To Find a Young Adult in Prison, CRIME REP. (Apr.
10, 2018), https://thecrimereport.org/2018/04/10/in-germany-its-hard-to-find-a-young-adult-in-prison
[https://perma.cc/96SW-H926 (dark archive)].
172. Teske & Albrecht, supra note 168, at 94.
173. Id. at 91.
174. BROTTSBALKEN [BRB] [PENAL CODE] 29:5 (Swed.), https://www.legislationline.org/
download/id/8662/file/Sweden_criminal_code_am2020_en.pdf [https://perma.ccXTL4-3AYJ].
175. Id.
176. Id. at 29:6 (“If, in view of a circumstance referred to in Section 5, it is manifestly unreasonable
to impose a sanction, the court may remit the sanction.”).
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to the penalty value of the offence.”177 This catchall clause allows the SPC to
approximate my thought that any sufficiently serious adversity might be natural
punishment. Also, the Swedish approach resembles my own in advising courts
to pay attention to past natural punishment as well as certain future, foreseeable
natural punishments.
The SPC has an important difference with my own approach. The SPC,
while focusing on harms that result from a crime, does not exclude harms that
stem from someone’s retributive intent. My proposal does not include such
harms as instances of natural punishment. In a way, the SPC is more capacious
than the proposal advanced here. It should be noted, however, that this wider
scope does not necessarily indicate any difference in view on any matter. The
SPC is not in the business of defining natural punishment; instead, it is offering
a set of conditions under which punishment discounts are warranted. Some of
those are what a theorist might call natural punishment; some are not. The SPC
takes no view on what counts as natural punishment, and this Article takes no
view on the full set of conditions under which punishment discounts are
warranted.
As a final note, both Sweden and Germany differ from my own approach
in that the decision to recognize natural punishment was legislative. The
proposal advanced here would understand natural punishment as genuine
punishment for constitutional purposes. While the U.S. Congress and all state
legislatures could pass laws saying as much, I envisioned this proposal as one
that would emanate from courts. There is longstanding debate about whether
courts are the proper site for instituting great changes, but it would be in
keeping with established American practice for courts to determine what is, or
is not, genuine punishment for constitutional purposes. It was the courts, not
Congress or the President, that determined that exposing prisoners to
secondhand smoke might be punishment.178 It was the courts that determined
that discipline in public schools is not punishment.179 It was the courts that
determined, against the protestations of Congress, that stripping someone of
citizenship is punishment.180 It was the courts that determined that deportation
generally is not punishment.181
C.

Australia

Australian law, where it recognizes natural punishment, does so by judicial
decision. Like the United States, Australia is a federal system. As such, there is
no single standard for dealing with natural punishment. Instead, “[e]ach
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 29:5.
See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993).
See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 660–76 (1977).
See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101–04 (1958).
See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893).
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Australian jurisdiction has its own sentencing law and process.”182 Like the
United States, Australia is also a common law country.183 That means that
sentencing is a function of both legislation and judge-made law, and in
Australia, “judges have considerable discretion to impose a penalty, so long as
it does not exceed the maximum penalty for the offence.”184 No Australian
sentencing statutes expressly mention natural punishment; thus, all recognition
of natural punishment in Australia “has evolved as part of the common law.”185
Many Australian jurisdictions recognize natural punishment when the
adversity is (1) the wrongdoer’s physical injury accidentally sustained in the
course of wrongdoing or (2) the wrongdoer’s physical injury accidentally caused
by others attempting to stop the wrongdoing or apprehend the wrongdoer.186
Fewer Australian courts recognize natural punishment when the adversity is (3)
the wrongdoer’s reputational injury caused by detection of the wrong, (4) the
wrongdoer’s pecuniary loss caused by job loss as a result of detection of the
wrong, or (5) the wrongdoer’s deportation as an administrative consequence of
conviction.187
The Australian system is similar to the proposal propounded in this Article
in several respects. First, in being most willing to recognize natural punishment
in cases like (1) and (2), Australian courts seem to stress that the adversity must
be sufficiently severe. This is in accord with my proposal. Second, in at least
being open to the possibility of natural punishment without physical injury,
Australia’s approach has wide application, like the approach for which I
advocate. Third, Australian courts place no restrictions on which offenders and
which offenses can qualify for punishment discounts. This also mirrors my
approach and sharply differs from that of Germany. Fourth, the Australian
system, like my own, allows for a continuous discounting, as opposed to the
German system of total discount versus none. Fifth and finally, the Australian
system comes from the courts.
Australia differs from my own account—and the systems in Sweden and
Germany—principally in its lack of uniformity. This is the blessing and curse
of federalism. If just a few lower courts were to adopt my proposal, variation
would mark the American system too, but this would fall short of the proposal
as envisioned. As envisioned, the proposal would look like other instances in
which something comes to count as constitutional punishment.188 It becomes
the law of the land.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Bagaric et al., supra note 55, at 50.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 55–61.
See id.
See supra Section II.A.
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CONCLUSION
In 2011, a young medical professional, by her own negligence, gave a
patient the wrong blood for a blood transfusion.189 The patient consequently
died.190 The medical professional was, in turn, charged with negligent
homicide.191 Following the patient’s death, the young medic suffered a severe
nervous breakdown, requiring medical attention.192 When her trial came, she
was unable to stay composed, and she had been completely unable to work for
a long time.193 She was duly convicted, as none of the facts were in dispute.194
What should happen at sentencing?
This sad fact pattern happened in Cologne, Germany, a jurisdiction that
recognizes natural punishment. Without resort to judicial chicanery,195 relying
on favorable charging decisions from prosecutors196 or clemency from the
executive, the judge was able to do the humane thing: to let the defendant walk
free because she had been punished enough. If this had happened in Columbus,
Ohio, a judge would not have been given the same opportunity. The American
criminal justice system, which does not recognize natural punishment, has a
lacuna, one that I have sought to expose and to begin to remedy.
The present Article is one of the earliest and most sustained expositions
of the natural punishment idea written in English. This Article has advanced a
proposal that American courts treat instances of natural punishment as genuine
punishment for constitutional purposes. The case for my proposal has been a
modest one. I have argued two things: First, natural punishment, understood
as an (1) adversity, (2) caused by wrongdoing, and (3) not caused by anyone’s
intention to exact retribution on the wrongdoer, is an intuitive and coherent
notion. Second, I have showed that judicial recognition of natural punishment
as constitutional punishment would not disrupt the American legal system.
Indeed, there are precedents and past practices that would allow this proposal
to work well.
I close by taking a wider view on why one might care about natural
punishment. I suspect (and hope) that cases of natural punishment are actually
rare. Robbers are not shooting themselves every other day; homicidal arsonists
are not routinely setting themselves ablaze; and fugitives are not often hit by
their own cars. The claim that natural punishment is rare is subject to a little
189. Amtsgericht Köln [AG Köln] [Cologne District Court] May 16, 2012, 613 Ls 3/12 (Ger.),
https://openjur.de/u/2199753.html [https://perma.cc/FDC6-5GTS].
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See supra note 16.
196. See supra Section IV.C.3.
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proviso: I suggested above that the idea of natural punishment may help to solve
“the mystery of credit for time served.”197 If it does, pretrial detention will often
count as an instance of natural punishment, and pretrial detention is extremely
common, maybe even too common. Besides that special circumstance, natural
punishment is an uncommon phenomenon. If it is so uncommon, why should
we think about it?
As a first pass, I have maintained that recognizing natural punishment is
a requirement of justice.198 Because I have not fully vindicated that contention,
I must add something more. I suggest that natural punishment is important,
not because of the magnitude of cases, but because thinking about it can reveal
other looming issues within American criminal justice. For instance, while
America does not recognize natural punishment, other nations do, and those
same nations also happen to punish fewer people and mete out less draconian
sentences, even in cases where natural punishment does not arise.199 It is a small
sample size, but this fact is significant. These other nations give less punishment
and see more punishment in the world. This reflects something that American
criminal justice apparently lacks, namely, a determination to think from the
perspective of wrongdoers and to attune oneself to wrongdoers’ suffering and
what that suffering means.
Consider something else that discussing natural punishment serves to
highlight. Natural punishment can easily satisfy many of the classical purposes
of punishment—retribution, deterrence, communication, and so on.200
Nonetheless, American law fails to recognize this as genuine punishment. This
suggests that American criminal practice, leaving aside theorists’
predilections,201 is insufficiently attentive to the questions of what punishment
is meant to achieve and which interventions or happenings help or hinder
this.202 In these and other ways, thinking about natural punishment tells us who
we are. This Article urges that we can, with a little effort, be different.

197. See supra Section III.B.
198. See supra Section IV.D.
199. See supra Part IV.
200. See supra Section I.C.
201. I am convinced by Ristroph that legal theorists often pay too much attention to the
justification of punishment. See Alice Ristroph, Conditions of Legitimate Punishment, in THE NEW
PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW 79, 81 (Chad Flanders & Zachary Hoskins eds., Rowman &
Littlefield Int’l 2016) (“With its unrelenting and myopic focus on desert and utility, punishment theory
becomes increasingly irrelevant and perhaps even irresponsible.”).
202. For another legal theorist stressing this point, see Jelani Jefferson-Exum, What’s the Point? The
Missing Piece of Criminal Justice Reform Through Consensus and Compromise, 32 FED. SENT’G. REP. 65, 65
(2019) (noting that in contemporary American criminal justice, we “lack a clear articulation of the
purpose of criminal sentencing. In other words, ‘What’s the point?’”).
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